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Abstract: Auditors risk costly litigation and loss of reputation when they are associated 
with clients that engage in substandard financial reporting, and prior research argues that 
accounting conservatism reduces managements‟ tendency to misreport. Thus, we predict 
that client conservatism affects auditor-client contracting by reducing auditor litigation 
and  reputation  risk.  Consistent  with  our  predictions,  we  find  that  conservative  audit 
clients are less likely to trigger auditor litigation or issue accounting restatements; and 
that auditors of conservative clients charge lower audit fees, issue fewer going concern 
opinions, and resign less frequently. Taken together, these findings are consistent with 
client accounting conservatism playing an important role in auditor-client contracting and 
outcomes.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Auditing researchers argue that litigation risk and reputation risk are the primary 
factors  incentivizing  auditors  to  provide  high  quality  audits  (e.g.,  Francis  and  Wang 
2004;  Hope  and  Langli  2010).  Litigation  risk  exposes  auditors  to  direct  financial 
penalties, while lost reputation impairs the auditor‟s ability to retain existing clients and 
attract new clients. Auditors are exposed to costly litigation and loss of reputation when 
they  are  suspected  of  allowing  substandard  reporting,  and  prior  research  argues  that 
accounting conservatism acts as a governance mechanism that reduces managements‟ 
tendency to misreport (e.g., Watts 2003; LaFond and Watts 2008). This suggests that 
conservative clients  are likely to impose lower  litigation and  reputation  risk on their 
auditors. If so, we expect this reduced risk to be reflected in audit fee negotiations, the 
audit  opinion  formulation  process,  and  auditors‟  client  retention  decisions.  Thus,  the 
purpose of this study is to test whether client conservatism is associated with lower audit 
fees,  the issuance of  fewer  going concern modified audit opinions,  and  less frequent 
auditor resignations. 
We begin our investigation by first testing whether conservative clients expose 
auditors to lower levels of litigation and reputation risk. We measure litigation risk using 
the incidence of auditor litigation, and reputation risk using the incidence of accounting 
restatements that correct a prior year‟s earnings overstatement (i.e., “income-decreasing” 
restatements).
1  We  measure  conditional  conservatism  using  the  firm -year  specific 
                                                 
1 We  use  income-decreasing  restatements  because  they  do  greater  damage  to  shareholder  value  when 
compared to other restatements (e.g., Palmrose et al. 2004), and hence are more likely to impair auditors‟ 
reputation.    2 
measure developed in Khan and Watts (2009 hereafter KW), and perform our tests using 
all  available  data  from  2000-2007.  Consistent  with  our  hypotheses,  we  find  that 
conservative  clients  are  less  likely  to  trigger  auditor  litigation  and  to  issue  income-
decreasing accounting restatements. Importantly, we also find that client conservatism 
reduces reputation risk independently of its affect on litigation risk, indicating that client 
conservatism  mitigates  auditors‟ reputation  risk beyond simply its  effect  on litigation 
risk.
2 Thus, our first set of tests provide evidence that conservative clients impose lower 
levels of both litigation and reputation risk on their external auditors. 
Next, we test whether the reduced litigation and reputation risk associated with 
conservative clients is reflected in auditor-client contracting and outcomes. We posit that 
if  less  conservative  clients  impose  greater  litigation  and  reputation  risk,  auditors  are 
likely to employ strategies to mitigate this risk. One such strategy is to charge higher 
audit fees, which compensates auditors for bearing this higher risk and for the additional 
audit  effort  that  is  likely  to  be  associated  with  auditing  less  conservative  clients 
(Johnstone and Bedard 2004; Matsumura and Tucker 1992). We also expect auditors to 
mitigate litigation and reputation risk by lowering the threshold for issuing going concern 
modified audit opinions to their less conservative clients. This is because the issuance of 
a  modified  audit  opinion  potentially  protects  the  auditor  in  the  event  of  litigation 
(Krishnan and Krishnan 1996). In addition, because less conservative clients are more 
likely  to  mask  poor  performance  by  misreporting,  issuing  a  going  concern  opinion 
reduces  the  auditor‟s  risk  of  inappropriately  issuing  a  clean  opinion  (Francis  and 
                                                 
2 While we examine the effect of client conservatism on auditor reputation risk after controlling for auditor 
litigation risk, we do not examine the reverse (i.e., the effect of client conservatism on auditor litigation risk 
after controlling for auditor reputation risk). This is because, as noted in prior studies, auditor litigation 
necessarily impairs auditor reputation. This confound is the motivation for Weber et al. (2008) and Skinner 
and Srinivasan (2011) to examine settings that are free from litigation risk.   3 
Krishnan 1999). Finally, we expect auditors to reduce litigation and reputation risk by 
resigning more frequently from less conservative clients (Pratt and Stice 1994; Krishnan 
and Krishnan 1997; Shu 2000). Thus, we hypothesize that auditors of conservative clients 
charge  lower  audit  fees,  issue  fewer  going  concern  audit  opinions,  and  resign  less 
frequently.
3  
Our tests support all three of our auditor-client contracting hypotheses regarding 
audit fees, auditor opinions and auditor resignations. We also perform multiple tests that 
examine whether these results are solely explained by the fact that client conservatism 
reduces  litigation  risk.  This  is  important  because  while  prior  studies  argue  that 
conservatism benefits auditors  by reducing litigation risk (Basu 1997; Watts 2003), we 
are also interested in whether conservatism benefits auditors by reducing reputation risk. 
This analysis finds that our results continue to hold after  we include an auditor litigation 
risk control variable, restrict our sample to firms and industries with low litigation  risk, 
and repeat our audit fee and modified opinion tests using data from four countries  with 
essentially no auditor litigation risk.  (We are unable to repeat our auditor resignation test 
in  these  countries  due  to  lack  of  data.)   Overall,  these  results  suggest  that  client 
conservatism affects auditor-client contracting through litigation and reputation risk, and 
that the effects of reputation risk are independent of the effects of litigation risk. Finally, 
we find that endogeneity does not explain our findings and that our results are robust to a 
host of alternative research design choices. 
Our findings make several contributions. One contribution is to the literature that 
examines the  consequences  of accounting conservatism.  This  literature  suggests  that 
                                                 
3 Because  it  is  unclear  whether  auditors  employ  all  three  strategies  or  some  subset,  we  test  all  three 
predictions independently. If auditors employ only a subset, it reduces our chances of finding empirical 
support for our predictions.   4 
conservatism benefits auditors, and we provide evidence on this assertion by finding that 
client conservatism is predictably associated with audit fees, audit opinion choice, and 
auditor  resignations.  Our  findings  also  suggest  that  litigation  and  reputation  risk  are 
channels through which conservatism influences auditor-client contracting and outcomes. 
While  the conservatism  literature  has  long argued  that conservatism  benefits  auditors 
through  reduced  litigation  risk  (e.g.,  Basu  1997;  Watts  2003),  we  are  the  first  to 
empirically document this association. Although Ettredge et al. (2012) also finds that 
conservatism is associated with fewer accounting restatements, we build on this finding 
by identifying the auditor-client contracting implications of this association. Evidence on 
the economic implications of accounting conservatism is particularly important given that 
standard-setters have eliminated conservatism as a qualitative characteristic of financial 
reporting (FASB 2010). 
We also contribute to the literature on auditors‟ incentives to produce high quality 
audits. While a large body of research investigates issues related to auditor litigation risk, 
there is little evidence on how reputation risk affects auditor-client contracting or auditor 
decision-making, particularly in the US.  Further, of the studies that do conclude that 
reputation risk affects auditor behavior, it is often difficult to rule out litigation risk as an 
alternative explanation (Weber et al. 2008; Skinner and Srinivasan 2011).
4 In contrast, 
our tests that focus on reputation risk employ a variety of procedures that control for the 
potentially confounding effects of litigation risk. Thus, we contribute to the auditing 
literature  by  providing  evidence  that  reputation   risk  affects  auditor-client  behavior 
independently of the effects of litigation risk. 
                                                 
4 For example, Chaney and Philipich (2002) acknowledge that the loss in value of Andersen‟s clients after 
the collapse of Enron may result from Andersen‟s inability to “insure” (via litigation) its remaining clients.   5 
Finally, we add to the studies that use accounting conservatism as a measure of 
audit  quality  (Qiang  2007;  Ruddock  et  al.  2006;  Krishnan  2005,  2007).  While  these 
studies  generally  assume  that  auditors  determine  the  level  of  conservatism  for  their 
clients, our evidence suggests that auditors also respond to the level of conservatism 
chosen by their clients. This is consistent with auditors having a constrained ability to 
determine clients‟ conservatism because managers have primary responsibility for firms‟ 
financial  reporting  choices  associated  with  the  implementing  GAAP.
 5 In  addition,  as 
discussed above, our endogeneity tests show that our results are not driven by auditors‟ 
influencing their clients‟ level of conservatism.
6 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section develops our 
hypotheses  and  the  third  section  discusses  variable  measurement  and  our  empirical 
models. The fourth section describes our sample and presents our empirical findings and 
the fifth section presents findings from sensitivity and robustness tests. The sixth section 
provides evidence from non-US countries, and the final section summarizes our study 
and findings.   
II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Accounting Conservatism and Auditor Litigation 
Prior research suggests that managers respond to litigation concerns by making 
conservative financial reporting choices to reduce their expected legal liability (e.g., Ball 
and Shivakumar 2005; Chung and Wynn 2008). However, while prior research focuses 
                                                 
5 In line  with this argument,  Qiang (2007) and Li et al. (2009) find that hiring Big N auditors is not 
associated with greater client conservatism after controlling for underlying client characteristics. 
6 While we explicitly perform tests to rule out the effects of endogeneity in Section V, we also believe that 
this potential problem is mitigated by our research design, which uses a one -year lagged measure of 
conservatism, rather than contemporaneous conservatism, as a test variable in each model. In other words, 
it is unlikely that auditors‟ decisions (such as charging audit fees, issuing going concern opinions and 
resigning from audit engagements) in the current year will affect the level of accounting conservatism in 
the previous year.   6 
primarily  on  whether  litigation  incentivizes  managers  to  report  conservatively,  we 
investigate how auditors respond to managers‟ conservatism choices. Just as conservative 
financial reporting reduces litigation risk to firms and managers, it is also expected to 
reduce litigation risk to auditors (Basu 1997; Watts 2003). Conservatism, which results in 
timelier recognition of bad news than good news, is likely to reduce auditor litigation risk 
because auditors are primarily sued for failing to reflect bad news timely in financial 
reports  (St.  Pierre  and  Andersen  1984;  Carcello  and  Palmrose  1994).  Conservative 
accounting practices make it difficult for plaintiffs to argue that audited financial reports 
do not provide adequate warning of impending problems (especially losses). In addition, 
conservative accounting is also likely to reduce client business risk. Specifically, prior 
research suggests that conservatism facilitates more efficient ex ante investment decisions 
and  greater  ex  post  monitoring  of  managers‟  investment  decisions,  leading  to  better 
allocation of capital (Ahmed and Duellman 2011; Watts 2003; Francis and Martin 2010). 
Since firms in poorer financial health are more likely to be sued (Palmrose 1987), better 
capital allocation is expected to reduce the incidence of auditor litigation. Based on the 
above  arguments,  we  expect  auditors  of  clients  with  relatively  more  conservative 
accounting  to  be  sued  relatively  less  frequently.  Thus,  our  first  hypothesis  is  (in 
alternative form): 
H1: Conservative audit clients are less likely to trigger litigation against auditors.  
 
Accounting Conservatism and Auditor Reputation 
Prior research finds that managers have stronger incentives to overstate earnings 
than to understate earnings (Watts 2003). This is consistent with Kothari et al. (2009) 
who find evidence that career concerns and compensation contracts provide incentives   7 
for managers to withhold and delay the disclosure of bad news but quickly reveal good 
news  to  investors.  LaFond  and  Watts  (2008),  however,  argue  that  conditional 
conservatism is likely to reduce the incidence of financial misreporting. Specifically, they 
suggest that conditional conservatism requires lower verification for the recognition of 
bad  news  than  good  news,  and  that  this  asymmetric  verifiability  acts  to  offset 
managements‟ natural tendency to hide the release of bad news and accelerate the release 
of  good  news.  By  limiting  managers‟  tendency  to  systematically  overstate  reported 
earnings,  conservatism  is  conjectured  to  act  as  a  governance  mechanism  that  curbs 
substandard financial reporting.  
Auditors  risk  losing  reputation  capital  when  market  participants  become 
concerned that they allow their clients to misreport, and a variety of events can raise such 
concerns.  For  example,  research  finds  that  auditors  lose  market  share,  and  that  their 
clients  lose  share  value,  following  negative  press  reports  and  the  announcement  of 
government investigations related to large audit failures (Weber et al. 2008; Skinner and 
Srinivasan 2011). Auditors also suffer reputational losses for behavior that falls short of 
major audit failures. For example, Hennes et al. (2011) find that auditors are more likely 
to be dismissed following accounting restatements; Hillary and Lennox (2005) find that 
auditors lose market share following negative AICPA peer review reports; Firth (2000) 
finds that auditors lose market share following government-agency inspection reports that 
criticize outside auditors; and Abbott et al. (2008) find that auditors are more likely to be 
dismissed following negative PCAOB inspection reports. Thus, research suggests that a 
variety  of  events  can  raise  concerns  among  market  participants  that  auditors  allow 
substandard financial reporting among their clients.    8 
We focus on a particularly salient event that suggests the auditor has allowed 
substandard  reporting:  accounting  restatements  that  correct  prior  year  earnings 
overstatements. Restatements are unequivocal evidence that the auditor failed to prevent 
misreporting and  the Securities  and Exchange  Commission considers them  “the most 
visible  indicator  of  improper  accounting”  (Schroeder  2001).  We  examine  income-
decreasing restatements because they harm shareholders relatively more than income-
neutral  or  income-increasing  restatements  (Palmrose  et  al.  2004;  Srinivasan  2005; 
Agrawal and Cooper 2009).
7 Hence they are more likely to impair auditors‟ reputation 
capital and thereby increase the power of our tests.
8 However, we are not suggesting that 
accounting conservatism is merely an instrument for “restatement risk.” Rather, we are 
arguing that conservatism affects reputation risk, where reputation impairment can result 
from  a  variety  of  outcomes  (as  discussed  above),  one  of  which  is  the  issuance  of  a 
restatement. Based on the above discussion, our second hypothesis is (in alternative form): 
H2:  Conservative  audit  clients  are  less  likely  to  issue  income-decreasing 
accounting restatements. 
 
Two  other  studies  also  test  for  an  association  between  conservatism  and 
restatements.  Givoly  et  al.  (2007)  examine  a  sample  of  restatements  over  the  period 
2000-2001  but  fail  to  find  a  significant  association  between  conservatism  and 
restatements. In a follow up study, Ettredge et al. (2012) use a larger sample from 1999-
2005  and  find  that  restatement  firms  are  significantly  less  conservative  during  the 
misstatement  year.  Our  analysis  is  performed  using  data  from  2000-2007  and  thus 
                                                 
7 Consistent with this argument, Callen et al. (2006) find that the market response to income-increasing 
restatement announcements is not significantly different from zero.  
8 Higher reputational penalties for the correction of income-decreasing restatements are also consistent with 
market participants inferring that such overstatements are opportunistic, since managers have greater 
incentives to overstate earnings than to understate earnings (Watts 2003).   9 
significantly overlaps with the time period examined in Ettredge et al. (2012). While the 
results in Ettredge et al. (2012) suggest that we are likely to find evidence supporting our 
second  hypothesis,  there  are  research  design  differences  in  our  study  that  make  this 
difficult to predict. One difference is that our tests include several control variables that 
are  not  included  in  Ettredge  et  al.  (2012).  This  is  a  potentially  important  difference 
because Cao et al. (2012) find that restatements are determined by a variety of client firm 
characteristics such as financing activity and operating complexity.  
Accounting Conservatism and Audit Fees 
If  accounting  conservatism  reduces  auditors‟  litigation  and  reputation  risk,  we 
expect auditors to engage in strategies that limit their risk exposure to less conservative 
clients. One such strategy is to charge higher audit fees. This is consistent with research 
that  finds  that  auditors  protect  themselves  by  charging  higher  fees  to  riskier  clients, 
including clients that pose higher litigation and reputation risk (e.g., Bell et al. 2001; 
Johnstone  and  Bedard  2004).  While  a  large  body  of  empirical  research  finds  that 
litigation risk is a priced risk factor reflected in audit fees (e.g., Simunic 1980), charging 
higher  fees  to  clients  that  pose  higher  reputational  risk  is  consistent  with  theoretical 
research that concludes that auditors are more likely to exert greater effort in auditing 
clients who have a greater likelihood of misstatement or fraud in an attempt to preserve 
their  reputation  capital  (Matsumura  and  Tucker  1992;  Hillegeist  1999),  and  with 
experimental research that finds that less risky clients require less audit effort (Davis et 
al. 1993). Thus, our third hypothesis is (in alternative form): 
H3: Auditors are likely to charge lower fees to their conservative clients.    
 
The two published studies  that examine the association between  audit fees  and   10 
restatements  find  mixed  results,  neither  of  which  is  suggested  by  our  prediction. 
Specifically, while Kinney et al. (2004) find that the association between audit fees and 
restatements is generally insignificant, Feldman et al. (2009) find that audit fees increase 
following restatements. In addition, working papers by Lobo and Zhao (2011) and Choy 
and Gul (2008) find that auditors charge lower audit fees prior to restatements, which is 
contrary to our prediction.
9 Thus, our prediction that auditors  ex ante price protect by 
charging higher audit fees to less conservative clients has not been documented in prior 
literature.
10  
Accounting Conservatism and Going Concern Opinions 
Prior research suggests that auditors can also limit their risk exposure by lowering 
their threshold for issuing going concern modified audit opinions. In particular, several 
studies  find  that  auditors  increase  the  propensity  to  issue  going  concern  opinions  to 
clients with high litigation risk (Krishnan and Krishnan 1996; Francis and Krishnan 1999; 
Geiger and Raghunandan 2001). This reduces the auditor‟s risk exposure because the 
issuance  of  a  going  concern  modified  audit  report  prior  to  bankruptcy  substantially 
lowers the incidence of auditor litigation and the magnitude of settlements against the 
auditor in the event of litigation (Palmrose 1988; Carcello and Palmrose 1994). Going 
concern  opinions  are  also  likely  to  mitigate  auditors‟  reputation  risk  because  less 
conservative clients are more likely to mask poor performance by overstating earnings. 
Thus, lowering the threshold for issuing a going concern opinion reduces the auditor‟s 
risk of inappropriately issuing a clean opinion when a modified opinion is appropriate 
                                                 
9 These studies argue that lower audit fees are consistent with lower auditor effort, which in turn leads to 
greater risk of audit failure (Dye 1993; Hillegeist 1999). 
10 As reported in Section V,  we also perform sensitivity tests that dr op sample firms that actually issue 
accounting restatements and find that our results are not explained by the presence of firms in our sample 
that issue restatements.   11 
(Francis and Krishnan 1999).  
Using going concern opinions to mitigate reputation risk is also consistent with 
the literature that suggests auditors increase their independence in response to reputation 
concerns (Benston 1975; Reynolds and Francis 2000; DeFond et al. 2002). In addition, 
because conservatism facilitates efficient investment decisions and better monitoring of 
managers‟ investment decisions (Ahmed and Duellman 2011; Watts 2003; Francis and 
Martin  2010),  conservative  clients  are  inherently  less  likely  to  have  going  concern 
problems,  which  further  reduces  auditors‟  incentives  to  issue  going-concern  audit 
opinions. Thus, our fourth hypothesis is (in alternative form): 
H4: Auditors are less likely to issue going concern opinions to their conservative 
clients.     
 
Accounting Conservatism and Auditor Resignations 
A third way for auditors to manage litigation and reputation risk is to resign from the 
audit  engagement.  This  is  consistent  with  prior  studies  that  document  a  positive 
association between client risk and auditor resignations (e.g., Johnston and Bedard 2004; 
Shu 2000), and suggests that auditors are more likely to resign from clients that adopt 
relatively less conservative financial reporting practices. In addition, while Hennes et al. 
(2011) find that clients are more likely to dismiss their auditor following restatements, 
dismissals are fundamentally distinct from auditor resignations and capture a different 
conceptual  construct.  Specifically,  auditor  dismissals  are  associated  with  clients‟ 
incentives  to  fire the auditor, while  auditor  resignations  are  associated  with  auditors‟ 
incentives to fire the client. Auditor dismissals are initiated by clients who tend to be 
motivated by events such as changes in client firm size or ownership structure, which 
lead to efficiency gains from auditor-client realignment (Johnson and Lys 1990; Francis   12 
and  Wilson  1988;  DeFond  1992).  In  contrast,  auditor  resignations  are  initiated  by 
auditors who tend to be motivated by reducing client risk (e.g., DeFond et al. 1997; Shu 
2000). Based on the above discussion, our fifth hypothesis is (in alternative form): 
H5: Auditors are less likely to resign from conservative clients.   
 
 
III. VARIABLES MEASUREMENT AND MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
Measuring Accounting Conservatism 
We  measure  firm-year  specific  accounting  conservatism  using  the  C_Score 
developed in KW. The traditional model from Basu (1997) is typically used to estimate 
either an industry-year measure (using a cross-section of firms in an industry), or a firm-
specific  measure  (using  a  time-series  of  firm-years).  KW  argues  that  the  C_Score 
improves upon the traditional conservatism measure from Basu (1997) by capturing both 
cross-sectional  and  inter-temporal  variations  in  the  conservatism  of  individual  firms 
without requiring a long time series of data. The construct validity of the C_Score is well 
documented  in  KW,  and  the  procedures  for  calculating  C_Score  are  summarized  in 
Appendix 2. Following Zhang (2008) and Louis et al. (2012), we rank the C_Score by 
deciles in each year to reduce noise in the estimates. We label the resulting variable 
CONSV, which is standardized between zero and one, with observations in the bottom 
decile valued zero and those in the top decile valued one. 
Auditor Litigation Model 
We test whether CONSV is associated with auditor litigation risk using a logit 
model to estimate the following auditor litigation risk model adapted from Shu (2000), 
where detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix 1:  
LITIG = α0 + α1 CONSV + α2 Ln_Assets + α3 Inventory + α4 Receivable + α5 ROA   13 
+ α6 Current + α7 Leverage + α8 Sales_Growth + α9 Return + α10 Volatility  
+ α11 Beta + α12 Turnover + α13 Delist + α14 Tech_Dummy + α15 GCM  
+ α16 BM + α17 Signed_DA + e                           (1) 
 
The dependent variable (LITIG) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the auditor 
is named as the defendant in a lawsuit during the year, and 0 otherwise. CONSV and all 
control variables are measured in the year prior to the lawsuit. A negative coefficient on 
CONSV is consistent with more conservative financial reporting reducing the likelihood 
of auditor litigation. We add two more control  variables,  BM and Signed_DA, to the 
original  model  in  Shu  (2000).  BM  is  included  following  the  suggestion  in  KW.
11 
Signed_DA is added because Heninger (2001) reports that auditor litigation is associated 
with upward earnings management through discretionary accruals. The regression model 
is estimated using two separate control groups: one consisting of all non-litigation firms 
and the second consisting of all non-litigation firms in the same Fama and French (1997) 
48 industries as the litigation firms. 
Restatement Model 
To  test  whether  accounting  conservatism  is  associated  with  the  incidence  of 
accounting restatements, we estimate the following logistic model adapted from Cao et 
al. (2012), where detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix 1:  
RESTATE = a0 + a1 CONSV + a2 ProbLit + a3 Size + a4 Volatility + a5 BM  
+ a6 Leverage + a7 ROA + a8 LOSS + a9 BigN + a10 MERGER  
+ a11 FINANCE + a12 NSEG + a13 FOPS + a14 Inv_Rec  
+ a15 Return + Year Dummies + e                          (2) 
 
                                                 
11 KW suggest that studies using C_Score as an independent variable should also directly control for firm 
size, leverage, and the book-to-market ratio because failing to do so may result in finding an association 
between conservatism and the variable of interest where there is no association. As reported in sensitivity 
tests in Section V, we find that our conclusions are insensitive to dropping these three variables from the 
model.   14 
RESTATE is an indicator variable that is valued 1 if the earnings for the firm-year 
or any quarter in the firm-year are subsequently restated downward, and 0 otherwise. 
Thus,  RESTATE  captures  the  misstatement  year  that  is  subsequently  restated.  All 
independent  variables  are  measured  in  the  concurrent  year  except  CONSV,  which  is 
measured in the previous year. We include the control variables from Cao et al. (2012), 
which finds that restatements are associated with a variety of factors such as leverage, 
financing  activity  and  operational  complexity.  A  negative  coefficient  on  CONSV  is 
consistent with conservatism reducing the incidence of restatements.  
Audit Fee Model 
To test whether accounting conservatism is associated with audit fees, we estimate 
the following OLS model based on prior research (e.g., Simunic 1980; Whisenant et al. 
2003;  Ashbaugh  et  al.  2003),  where  detailed  variable  definitions  are  presented  in 
Appendix 1: 
LAUDIT =γ0 + γ1 CONSV + γ2 ProbLit + γ3 Size + γ4 Quick + γ5 Loss + γ6 ROA  
+ γ7 Leverage + γ8 Inv_Rec + γ9 BM + γ10 NSEG + γ11 SPITEM + γ12 FOPS  
+ γ13 Merger + γ14 Finance + γ15 Pension + γ16 BigN + γ17 GCM  
+ γ18 Busy + Industry & Year Dummies + e             (3) 
 
The dependent variable (LAUDIT) is measured as the log of audit fees in thousands 
of dollars. All independent variables are measured in the year concurrent with the audit 
fees except CONSV, which is measured in the previous year. A negative coefficient on 
CONSV is consistent with auditors charging lower fees to their conservative clients. 
Going Concern Opinion Model   
To test whether accounting conservatism is associated with the issuance of going 
concern modified audit opinions, we estimate the following logistic model adapted from 
DeFond et al. (2002), where detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix 1:    15 
OPIN = λ + λ1 CONSV + λ2 ProbLit + λ3 ZScore + λ4 Size + λ5 Ln_Age + λ6 Beta  
  + λ7 Return + λ8 Volatility + λ9 Leverage + λ10 CLeverage + λ11 LLoss 
  + λ12 Investment + λ13 Cashflow + λ14 Future_Finance + λ15 BigN  
  + λ16 BM + Year Dummies + e                                                                               (4) 
 
The dependent variable (OPIN) is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a 
client firm receives a going concern audit report for the first time, and 0 otherwise. All 
independent  variables  are  measured  in  the  concurrent  year  except  CONSV,  which  is 
measured in the previous year. Following prior literature (e.g., DeFond et al. 2002), we 
estimate the model using a sample of distressed firms, defined as firms that report either 
negative net income or negative operating cash flows during the current fiscal year. A 
negative coefficient on CONSV is consistent with auditors issuing fewer going concern 
modified audit opinions to their conservative clients. 
Auditor Resignation Model  
To test whether accounting conservatism is associated with auditor resignations, we 
estimate the following logistic regression model adapted from Landsman et al. (2009), 
where detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix 1: 
RESIGN = β0 + β1 CONSV + β2 ProbLit + β3 Asset_Growth + β4 Abs_DA + β5 Inv_Rec 
 + β6 GCM + β7 Clean + β8 Tenure + β9 ROA + β10 Loss + β11 Leverage  
+ β12 Cash + β13 Disagree + β14 Rep_Event + β15 BigN + β16 Ln_Assets  
+ β17 Merger + β18 BM + e                          (5) 
 
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Landsman et al. 2009; Kim and Park 2009), we 
estimate  this  model  using  auditor  switch  firms  and  measure  all  of  the  independent 
variables in the year prior to the auditor switch. The dependent variable (RESIGN) is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the auditor resigns and 0 otherwise (i.e., if the auditor is 
dismissed). A negative coefficient on CONSV is consistent with auditors resigning less 
frequently from their conservative clients.   16 
IV. SAMPLE AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Data 
We  collect  data  for  audit-related  information  and  restatements  from  the  Audit 
Analytics database for the period 2000-2007.
12 Because our conservatism measure and 
control variables in some models are one-year lagged, they are estimated for the period 
1999-2006. Consistent with prior research, we remove firms in the financial sector (SIC 
codes 60-69)  and  trim all continuous variables at the top and bottom one percent to 
remove extreme values. 
Empirical Results   
Results for Auditor Litigation Tests 
The sample for our auditor litigation test consists of all data from the Auditlegal 
database of Audit Analytics. After limiting the sample to firms with data in CRSP and 
Compustat, our final sample consists of 79 auditor lawsuits. This is a reasonably large 
sample when compared to other auditor litigation studies. For example, Heninger (2001), 
Stice  (1991),  and  Lys  and  Watts  (1994)  examine  67,  49,  and  40  auditor  lawsuits, 
respectively. We perform our tests using  two non-litigation control groups: (1) a full 
sample of all available firm-year observations without auditor litigation (n=17,882) and 
(2) all available firm-year observations matched on industry (n=6,092). 
The results from estimating our litigation model are presented in Table 1. Panel A 
provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the auditor litigation test, for both 
the treatment and control firms, along with mean t-tests and median Wilcoxon z-tests of 
                                                 
12 Audit Analytics includes restatements made by public companies to correct accounting that does not 
conform  to GAAP. Thus, it  excludes restatements due to changes in accounting principles, GAAP-to-
GAAP changes, and changes in estimates. Our sample period ends in 2007 because Cheffers et al. (2010) 
shows  that  the  average  time  lag  between  the  original  financial  statement  release  and  a  restatement  is 
roughly about two years.    17 
differences across the two types of firms. The mean and median CONSV for the litigation 
firms (LITIG = 1) are significantly smaller than those for the control firms (LITIG = 0) in 
both the full and industry-matched samples. While this is consistent with conservative 
clients triggering less litigation against auditors, we defer to our multivariate analysis to 
formally test our first hypothesis. Panel A also finds that the litigation firms tend to be 
larger in size (Ln_Assets), less liquid (Current), more leveraged (Leverage), have greater 
systematic risk (Beta), have higher stock turnover (Turnover), and have a lower book-to-
market  ratio  (BM).  Table  1,  Panel  B  presents  Pearson  correlation  statistics.  Because 
C_Score is estimated by a linear transformation of size, leverage, and the market-to-book 
ratio, the correlations between CONSV and these variables are reasonably large.
13 
The  results  of  the  auditor  litigation  test  are  presented  in  Table  1,  Panel  C. 
Columns (1) and (2) report the results where the control firms consist of the full sample 
of firm-year observations without litigation, and columns (3) and (4) report the results 
where the control firms consist of  the industry-matched sample. The model is estimated 
with robust standard errors clustered by firm to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial 
dependence  (Petersen  2009).  When  the  regression  model  is  estimated  without 
conservatism (CONSV) in columns (1) and (3), the results are generally consistent with 
those in Shu (2000). Also, consistent with Heninger (2001), we find in the industry-
matched  sample  that  signed  discretionary  accruals  are  positively  related  to  auditor 
litigation. When CONSV is included in columns (2) and (4), the coefficients on CONSV 
are negative and statistically significant at p<0.01 (two-tailed). Thus, the results find that 
                                                 
13 As a result of the relatively high correlations between CONSV and some of our control variables, we 
perform several sensitivity tests on all of our multivariate models. As reported in Section V, these tests 
indicate that multicollinearity is unlikely to influence our results.   18 
accounting  conservatism  is  associated  with  a  lower  incidence  of  auditor  litigation, 
consistent with our first hypothesis. 
Results for Restatement Tests 
Since we are interested in whether conservatism is associated with reputation risk 
independent  of  its  effects  on  litigation  risk,  we  restrict  our  restatement  sample  to 
restatements that do not result in subsequent auditor litigation. In addition, in this and all 
of our subsequent tests we control for litigation risk in the following three ways: (1) we 
specifically include a variable capturing the probability of auditor litigation (ProbLit), 
which is fitted using the parameters and variables in Table 3 of Shu (2000). Including 
ProbLit in our tests will inform us whether CONSV has explanatory power beyond its 
effects on auditor litigation risk; (2) we repeat our analysis after limiting the sample to 
the firms with the lowest decile of the probability of auditor litigation (ProbLit) among 
all firms listed in Compustat in each year; and (3) we repeat our analysis after limiting the 
sample to firms in industries that have a low probability of litigation as identified in 
LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008).
14  
We begin our  restatement analysis by  identifying  2,357 restatement firm-year 
observations  with  data  available  in  Compustat  and  CRSP ,  where  the  restatement 
dependent variable is measured during the  year of the original misstatement. We then 
exclude  restatements  that  tri gger  litigation  against  auditors  (112  observations), 
restatements that have a positive impact on income (349 observations), a zero impact on 
income (612 observations), and restatements with a trivial income effect, defined as those 
with less than a one million dollar impact on income (370 observations). This yields a 
                                                 
14 Specifically, low litigation industries are defined as industries other than the following high litigation risk 
industries: biotechnology (SIC codes 2833–2836), computers (SIC codes 3570–3577 and 7370), electronics 
(SIC codes 3600–3674), and retailing (SIC codes 5200–5961).   19 
final sample of 914 restatements. The control sample includes 14,853 non-restated firm-
year observations during the sample period. 
Table 2, Panel  A presents the means  and medians  of the variables  used in  the 
restatement model partitioned on the dependent variable. Panel A reports that the mean 
and median value of CONSV is smaller for the restatement firms (RESTATE = 1) than 
those for the control firms (RESTATE = 0) with the differences significant at p<0.01. This 
univariate  test  indicates  that  conservative  clients  are  less  likely  to  issue  income-
decreasing restatements, although we defer to our multivariate analysis to formally test 
our second hypothesis. Not surprisingly, Panel A also indicates that the restatement firms 
have a higher mean and median probability of  auditor litigation. Panel B of Table 2 
presents  the  Pearson  correlations  between  the  variables  in  the  restatement  test.  The 
correlations find that CONSV is negatively correlated with RESTATE (-0.04), consistent 
with the result in Panel A. The highest correlations are between SIZE and ProbLit (0.53), 
and ROA and Loss (-0.53).  
Table 2, Panel C presents multivariate results for our restatement tests. Columns (1) 
and  (2)  report  the  full  sample  results  and  find  that  the  coefficient  on  accounting 
conservatism  (CONSV)  is  significantly  negative  at  p<0.01.  This  indicates  that 
conservative clients are less likely to issue income-decreasing restatements, consistent 
with our second hypothesis. This result is also consistent with Ettredge et al. (2012), 
which shows that Basu-based conservatism metrics are significantly lower for periods of 
overstated  earnings.  Column  (2)  reports  that  the  coefficient  on  CONSV  remains 
significantly negative at p<0.01 after controlling for the probability of auditor litigation 
(ProbLit). Column (3) reports that the coefficient on CONSV is significantly negative at   20 
p<0.05 after limiting the sample to clients in the bottom decile of auditor litigation risk, 
and column (4) reports that the coefficient on CONSV is significantly negative at p<0.01 
after limiting the sample to clients in low litigation industries. Thus, consistent with our 
second hypothesis, we find that conservative audit clients are less likely to issue income-
decreasing restatements.
15 
The coefficients on the control variables indicate  that firms with higher book-to-
market ratios (BM), higher leverage (Leverage), higher stock return volatility (Volatility), 
larger inventories and receivables (Inv_Rec), and foreign operations (FOPS), are more 
likely to restate. These results are largely consistent with those reported in Cao et al. 
(2012).  
Results for Audit Fees Tests 
Our audit fee sample consists of 18,824 firm-year observations. Table 3, Panel A 
reports the means and medians of the variables used in the audit fee model partitioned on 
the median audit fee of $514,000. This analysis finds that mean and median CONSV is 
significantly lower in the high audit fee partition than in the low audit fee partition, at 
p<0.01.  This  suggests  that  on  a  univariate  basis,  auditors  charge  lower  fees  to  their 
conservative  clients.  Consistent  with  prior  research,  Panel  A  also  indicates  that  our 
control variables capture a variety of factors that influence audit fees. Table 3, Panel B 
presents  the  Pearson  correlations  between  the  variables  in  the  audit  fee  test.  The 
correlations find that CONSV is negatively correlated with logged audit fees, LAUDIT (-
0.38), consistent with the results in Panel A. Not surprisingly, the highest correlations 
                                                 
15 In untabulated analysis we also perform a test to examine whether CONSV is associated with income-
increasing restatements by estimating the restatement model after replacing the dependent variable by an 
indicator variable that is valued 1 if the earnings are subsequently restated upward, and 0 otherwise. We 
find that the coefficient on CONSV is not significantly associated with income-increasing restatements for 
all four models presented in Table 2, Panel C.    21 
among  the independent  variables  are between  LOSS and  ROA  (-0.64),  and SIZE  and 
ProbLit (0.62). 
Table 3, Panel C reports the multivariate results for our audit fee tests. Column (1) 
shows that the coefficient on CONSV is significantly negative at p<0.01, consistent with 
auditors charging lower audit fees to their conservative clients. Columns (2), (3) and (4) 
report  that  the  coefficient  on  CONSV  remains  significantly  negative  at  p<0.01  after 
controlling for the probability of auditor litigation (ProbLit), after limiting the sample to 
clients in the bottom decile of auditor litigation risk, and after limiting the sample to 
clients in low litigation industries, respectively. Hence the evidence reported in Table 3 
supports our third hypothesis. 
Consistent  with  prior  research,  most  of  the  control  variables  in  Panel  C  are 
significantly  associated  with  audit  fees  at  p<0.01.  Specifically,  audit  fees  are  higher 
among clients that are larger (Size), have higher operating risk (Loss and Leverage), have 
greater complexity (NSEG, SPITEM, and FOPS), have December year-ends (Busy), that 
are less profitable (ROA), that engage in mergers and acquisitions (Merger), that have 
Big N auditors (BigN), and when auditors issue a going concern opinion (GCM). 
Results for Going Concern Modified Opinion Tests 
Our going concern sample consists of 7,049 firm-year observations of distressed 
firms that report either negative net income or negative operating cash flows.
16 Of these 
observations, 8 percent (541 observations) receive a going concern opinion for the first 
                                                 
16 In order to conserve sample size for the distressed firms in our going concern opinion tests we do not 
impose the data filters in estimating C_Score. Footnote 11 of Khan and Watts (2009) indicates that their 
results  are  generally  robust  to  including  those  filters  when  estimating  C_Score.  When  we  perform 
sensitivity  analyses  for  all  of  our  other  tests  (auditor  litigation,  restatement,  audit  fees,  and  auditor 
resignation  tests)  with  this  less  restrictive  C_Score  estimation  procedure,  the  results  are  qualitatively 
identical.    22 
time  during  the  sample  period,  which  is  consistent  with  DeFond  et  al.  (2002)  and 
Reynolds and Francis (2000), where the proportions are 9 and 8 percent respectively. 
Table 4, Panel A reports the means and medians of the variables used in the going 
concern model, partitioned on whether the client receives a going concern opinion. This 
analysis finds that the association between CONSV and going concern opinions is not 
significant at conventional levels. Panel A also finds that there are significant differences 
across each of the control variables, highlighting the importance of controlling for these 
variables in our multivariate hypothesis tests. We rely on the multivariate analysis to test 
our prediction because the univariate tests do not control for other factors associated with 
the  issuance  of  going  concern  opinions.
17 Table  4,  Panel  B  presents  the  Pearson 
correlations between the variables in the going concern test and reports that the highest 
correlations  among  the  independent  va riables  are  between  Leverage  and  Cleverage 
(0.73), SIZE and Beta (0.53), and CONSV and Beta (-0.53).
18  
Table 4, Panel C reports the multivariate results of our going concern opinion tests. 
Column (1) reports that the coefficient on  CONSV is significantly negative at p<0.01, 
indicating that auditors are less likely to issue going concern opinions to conservative 
clients.  Columns  (2),  (3)  and  (4)  report  that  the  coefficient  on  CONSV  remains 
significantly negative at p<0.10 after all of our controls for litigation risk. Overall, the 
results presented in Table 4 supports our fourth hypothesis. 
                                                 
17 In untabulated analysis we also perform univariate tests that match each going concern firm with a non-
going concern firm based on its expected probability of receiving a going concern opinion in the same year. 
We  estimate  the  expected  probability  of  receiving  a  going  concern  opinion  using  equation  (4)  after 
excluding CONSV. This analysis finds that both mean and median CONSV is significantly lower among the 
going concern firms than among the matched non-going concern firms (at p<0.01), consistent with our 
fourth hypothesis. 
18 While  these  correlations  are  relatively  large,  sensitivity  tests  r eported  in  Section  V  indicate  that 
multicollinearity is unlikely to influence our results.   23 
In addition, the results for the control variables reported in Panel C are generally 
consistent with prior literature. Specifically, firms receiving going concern opinions tend 
to  have  higher  bankruptcy  scores  (ZScore),  smaller  size  (Size),  higher  leverage 
(Leverage), higher stock return volatility  (Volatility), losses (LLoss), poorer operating 
cash flows (Cashflow), lower liquidity (Investment). 
Results for Auditor Resignation Tests 
Our auditor resignation sample consists of 1,936 firm-year observations that change 
auditors,  excluding  clients  of  Andersen  during  2001-2002.  Fifteen  percent  (300 
observations) of the changes are auditor-initiated resignations while the remaining are 
client-initiated auditor dismissals. The smaller proportion of auditor resignations relative 
to dismissals is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Landsman et al. 2009; Kim and Park 
2009). 
Table 5, Panel A reports the means and medians of the variables used in the auditor 
resignation model, partitioned on whether the auditor resigned or was dismissed from the 
audit engagement. This analysis finds that CONSV does not significantly differ across 
resignation and dismissal firms at conventional levels. Panel A also shows that there are 
significant  differences  across  most  of  the  control  variables  for  the  two  groups.  For 
example, resignation firms exhibit a higher probability of auditor litigation (ProbLit), are 
smaller in  size (Ln_Assets), are less likely to  be audited by Big 4 or  Big 5 auditors 
(BigN),  are  more  likely  to  report  losses  (Loss),  have  Form  8-K  reportable  events 
(Rep_Event), and are more likely to receive a going concern opinion (GCM). Thus, it is 
important to control for these variables in our multivariate hypothesis tests.
19 
                                                 
19 In untabulated analysis we also perform univariate tests that match each resignation firm with a dismissal 
firm based on its expected probability of resignation in the same year. We estimate the expected probability   24 
Table 5, Panel B presents the Pearson correlations between the variables in the 
resignation test. Consistent with Panel A, the correlation between CONSV and auditor 
resignations  is  positive  but  not  significant.  Panel  B  also  reports  that  the  highest 
correlations among the independent variables are between Ln_Assets and ProbLit (0.52), 
and Loss and ROA (-0.60). 
Table 5, Panel C reports the multivariate results of our resignation tests. Column (1) 
reports that the coefficient on accounting conservatism (CONSV) is significantly negative 
at p<0.01, indicating that auditors are less likely to resign from their conservative clients, 
consistent with our fifth hypothesis. Columns (2), (3) and (4) reports that the coefficient 
on CONSV remains significantly negative at p<0.05 after all of our controls for litigation 
risk. Thus, the results presented in Table 5 support our fifth hypothesis. 
Consistent with prior research, the control variables in Panel C also indicate that 
auditors  are  more  likely  to  resign  from  clients  with  shorter  tenure  (Tenure),  higher 
leverage (Leverage), more reportable events (Rep_Event), larger absolute discretionary 
accruals (Abs_DA), smaller size (Ln_Assets), and when they are smaller auditors (BigN). 
 
V. SENSITIVITY AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Conservatism Estimated over the Previous Three Years 
We measure CONSV during the year immediately preceding the year in which the 
dependent  variables  are  measured.  However,  Givoly  and  Hayn  (2000)  argue  that 
conservatism in one period can lead to non-conservative results in subsequent periods. 
Thus,  we  repeat  our  analyses  after  estimating  CONSV  over  the  previous  three  years 
                                                                                                                                                 
of resignation using equation (5) after excluding CONSV. This analysis finds that both mean and median 
CONSV is significantly lower among the resignation firms than among the matched dismissal firms (at 
p<0.01), consistent with our fifth hypothesis.   25 
(CONSV_3YR). We report the results in Panel A of Table 6. Since this measure requires 
data for at least three years, the sample size is reduced in each test. To conserve space, we 
only report the coefficients for CONSV and ProbLit. Consistent with our primary results, 
the coefficients on CONSV_3YR are negative and significant at p<0.01 in all of our tests.  
Alternative Measure of Adjusted Conservatism 
KW shows that higher C_Score values are associated with higher probabilities of 
litigation, longer investment cycles, higher idiosyncratic uncertainty, lower firm age, and 
higher information asymmetry. Since these are potentially omitted correlated variables in 
our  analysis,  we  perform  sensitivity  tests  using  a  measure  of  adjusted  conservatism 
(ADJ_CONSV), following KW, which is orthogonal to these variables. These estimation 
procedures are summarized in Appendix 3. We report the results using this alternative 
measure in Panel B of Table 6. Since this measure requires additional data, the sample 
size is reduced. The results indicate that the coefficients on ADJ_CONSV are negative 
and significant at p<0.05 in all of our tests.  
Alternative Measure of Conservatism based on Givoly and Hayn (2000) 
While we use the C_Score developed in Khan and Watts (2009) to capture firm-
level  conditional  conservatism,  an  alternative  measure  is  non-operating  accruals 
suggested by Givoly and Hayn (2000). Thus, we repeat our analyses using this alternative 
measure (CONSV_NOA_3YR).
20 The results, reported in Panel C of Table 6 find that the 
coefficient on CONSV_NOA_3YR is negative and significant for the auditor litigation, 
                                                 
20 To estimate CONSV_NOA_3YR, we first compute non-operating accruals annually as follows (all items 
deflated by beginning total assets):  
Non-operating accruals = Total accruals (before depreciation) − Operating accruals  
= [(Net Income + Depreciation) − Cash flow from operations] − (Δ Accounts receivable + Δ Inventories + 
Δ Prepaid expenses − Δ Accounts payable − Δ Taxes payable). 
Non-operating  accruals  are  multiplied  by  negative  one  so  that  the  value  increases  with  the  level  of 
conservatism. To mitigate the effect of temporary non-operating accruals that reverse in subsequent years, 
we take the average of non-operating accruals over the previous three years.    26 
restatement,  audit  fee  and  auditor  resignation  tests.  For  the  going  concern  test,  the 
coefficient on CONSV_NOA_3YR is negative and insignificant at p<0.10 in two-tailed 
tests  but  is  significant  in  one-tailed  test  (p  =  0.082),  consistent  with  our  one-tailed 
prediction. Therefore, overall, our results are robust to using this alternative measure of 
conservatism. 
Multicollinearity 
We include firm size, leverage, and the book-to-market ratio in each model that 
includes CONSV because Khan and Watts (2009, p.148) argue that failing to do so may 
result in finding an association between conservatism and the variable of interest where 
there is none. However, the correlation matrix for each model shows that C_Score tends 
to have a high correlation with firm size, leverage, and the book-to-market ratio. Thus, 
we  perform  the  following  analysis  to  gain  comfort  that  multicollinearity  is  not 
influencing  our  results.  First,  we  check  the  variance-inflation  factors  (VIF)  for  the 
independent variables in each model. We find that the highest VIF value is 7.3 for SIZE 
in the restatement analysis.
21 Since Neter et al. (1996) indicates that  multicollinearity is 
not a concern for  VIF factors  of  less than 10,  this suggests that  multicollinearity  is 
unlikely to influence our results. Second, we repeat our analysis after excluding firm size, 
leverage, and the book-to-market ratio from our regressions. As documented in Panel D 
of Table 6, the coefficients on CONSV remain significant at p<0.10 (two-tailed).
22 Thus, 
it does not appear that multicollinearity influences our results. 
Endogeneity  
                                                 
21 We compute VIFs using OLS for our models that are estimated using logit. 
22 We also compute the VIF factors for these models (without firm size, leverage and book-to-market ratio) 
and find that the highest VIF is 2.05,  which is also  below the threshold of 10 suggested in Neter et al. 
(1996).   27 
While  our  tests  implicitly  assume  that  auditors  respond  to  the  level  of 
conservatism chosen by the client, it is also possible that auditors influence the level of 
conservatism  (i.e.,  reverse  causality).  As  discussed  previously,  however,  our  research 
design, which uses one-year lagged measures of conservatism, alleviates concerns about 
endogeneity to some degree. Nevertheless, we also perform formal tests to assess whether 
our dependent variables (namely, LITIG; RESTATE; LAUDIT; OPIN; and RESIGN) are 
affected by endogeneity using the two-stage instrumental variable approach employed in 
the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (David and MacKinnon 1993). In the first stage, following 
KW, we estimate conservatism using the probability of litigation (ProbLit), idiosyncratic 
uncertainty  (Volatility),  length  of  the  investment  cycle  (Cycle),  firm  age  (Age),  and 
information asymmetry (Spread), together with all of the other control variables used in 
the  respective  regression  models.  Because  ProbLit  and  Volatility  are  used  as  control 
variables in most of our models, we employ the other three variables (Cycle, Age, and 
Spread) as instrumental variables. As suggested in Larcker and Rusticus (2010), we also 
formally test the strength of our instrumental variables by computing partial F-statistics 
of the instruments used in the first stage regressions. The partial F-statistics range from 
27.56 to 114.60, much higher than the minimum benchmark of 12.83 for models with 
three instruments as reported in Larcker and Rusticus (2010). Thus, we conclude that our 
model does not suffer from problems associated with the inclusion of weak instruments. 
We then augment equations (1) through (5) by including the residuals (RES) from 
this first stage regression. The significance of RES tests for the potential existence of 
endogeneity. The results reported in Panel E of Table 6 show that the residuals obtained 
from the auditor litigation, going concern opinion, and auditor resignation models are all   28 
insignificant, indicating a lack of endogeneity. However, RES is significant at p<0.01 for 
the restatement and audit fee models, suggesting that endogeneity may be a concern. 
Hence, we use the predicted value of conservatism (Predict_CONSV) from the first stage 
regression to replace CONSV in the restatement and audit fee models. The results indicate 
that the coefficients on Predict_CONSV are still negative and significant at p<0.01 in 
both models. This indicates that even after controlling for the endogeneity, conservative 
clients  are  less  likely  to  restate  and  that  auditors  charge  lower  fees  to  conservative 
clients.
23  
Controlling for Earnings Management 
Following  prior  literature,  we  control  for  signed  discretionary  accruals 
(Signed_DA) in our litigation model, and absolute discretionary accruals (Abs_DA) in our 
resignation model. However, discretionary accruals may also be important variables in 
our  other  models.  Thus,  to  provide  more  consistent  and  comprehensive  evidence  on 
whether discretionary accruals are likely to explain our findings, we repeat each of our 
tests  using  three  different  measures  of  discretionary  accruals:  signed  discretionary 
accruals,  absolute  discretionary  accruals,  and  a  model  specifically  capturing  income-
increasing discretionary accruals. The results, reported in Panels F, G, and H of Table 6, 
find that the coefficients on CONSV continue to be significantly negative at p<0.01 after 
                                                 
23 We also note that the direction of the possible endogeneity bias may be in the opposite direction of our 
hypotheses, which biases against our findings. Specifically, higher audit fees may be associated with higher 
conservatism  if  the  auditor  were  to  choose  the  level  of  conservatism,  because  imposing  greater 
conservatism  on  the  client  by  the  auditor  is  expected  to  require  greater  auditor  effort.  Similarly, 
restatements  may  be  associated  with  higher  conservatism  if  the  auditor  were  to  choose  the  level  of 
conservatism, because the changes that are likely to follow restatements (e.g., such as improvement in 
governance, Srinivasan 2005) are expected to encourage auditors to impose greater conservatism.   29 
including these controls.
24  
Results with Sub-sample of Big N Clients Only 
Although our models include a control for Big N auditors, the choice of Big N 
auditors  and  their  higher  exposure  to  litigation  and  reputation  risk  may  potentially 
confound our results. Thus, we repeat our analysis after restricting the sample to client 
firms audited by Big 4 or Big 5 auditors. The results are reported in Panel I of Table 6 
and find that the coefficient on CONSV is significantly negative at p<0.01 in all of our 
tests. 
Controlling for Corporate Governance  
Lara et al. (2009) find that firms with stronger corporate governance exhibit a 
higher  degree  of  accounting  conservatism.  In  addition,  prior  research  suggests  that 
stronger governance is associated with higher audit fees (Carcello et al. 2002), a lower 
likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion (Carcello and Neal 2000), and a lower 
likelihood of auditor resignations (Lee et al. 2004). Thus, to ensure that governance is not 
an  omitted  correlated  variable,  we  repeat  our  analysis  after  including  the  following 
variables that control for corporate governance (following Lara et al. 2009): the G-index 
(Gindex) (Gompers et al. 2003); whether CEO is chairman (Duality), proportion of top 
executives  on  the  board  (Executive),  and  number  of  board  meetings  during  the  year 
(Meeting).
25 The results are reported in Panel J of Table 6 and find that the coefficients on 
CONSV remain significantly negative at p<0.01 in all of our tests.  
                                                 
24 In order to compare all discretionary accruals measures across all models in a single table, we repeat the 
results in Table 1, Panel C (for our litigation model) and the results in Table 5, Panel C (for our resignation 
model) in Panels F and G of Table 6.   
25 The external governance data ( Gindex) is obtained from Andrew Metrick‟s web page and the internal 
governance data is from the Execucomp and Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) databases. 
Due  to  missing  governance  data,  we  use  the  „modified  zero-order  regression‟  method  suggested  by   30 
Controlling for Restatement Firms in Audit Fee Tests 
  Feldman et al. (2009) find that audit fees increase following restatements. While it 
is unclear how this might potentially impact our audit fee analysis, we repeat our audit 
fee test currently reported in Table 3, Panel C, column (2) after dropping all firms (for all 
years) that report a restatement during our sample period.  For completeness, we also 
repeat our litigation, going concern and resignation tests in Tables 1, 4 and 5 (Panel C, 
column (2)). The results, which are not tabled, continue to find that the coefficient on 
CONSV is significantly negative at p<0.01 in all of the tests. 
Alternative Specification for Going Concern Opinion Tests 
Currently,  we  follow  prior  literature  in  our  going  concern  opinion  tests  by 
restricting our analysis to distressed firms as defined in DeFond et al. (2002). To test 
sensitivity of our results to this specification, we rerun our going concern opinion test in 
Table 4, Panel C, column (2) by altering the sample estimated in the model. First, we use 
an  alternative  definition  for  financially  distressed  firms.  Following  Geiger  and 
Raghunandan (2001), we classify a firm as being in financial distress if at least one of the 
following criteria is met: negative working capital at the end of the fiscal year, negative 
retained earnings at the end of the fiscal year, or loss for the fiscal year. Second, we 
estimate  the  model  with  the  full  sample  of  client  firms  that  have  available  data 
(n=18,924) without restricting the sample to the distressed firms. Untabulated results for 
both tests find that the coefficient on CONSV is significantly negative at p<0.01. 
Alternative Specification for Auditor Resignation Tests 
                                                                                                                                                 
Maddala (1977) and Greene (2003). This method substitutes a zero for missing values and adds an indicator 
variable coded one if the corresponding variable is missing.    31 
Currently, we  follow prior literature in  our  resignation tests  by  restricting  the 
sample to firms that switch auditors. To test sensitivity of our results to this specification, 
we  repeat  our  auditor  resignation  test  in  Table  5,  Panel  C,  column  (2)  without  this 
restriction (n=22,358). We also exclude the variables Disagree and Rep_Events as these 
variables are relevant only to auditor-switching clients. The untabulated results from this 
test are consistent with those currently reported. Specifically, we continue to find that the 
coefficient on CONSV is significantly negative at p<0.01. 
 
VI. TESTS WITH FIRMS FROM LESS LITIGIOUS NON-US COUNTRIES 
Motivation and Sample 
In this section we further control for the effects of auditor litigation by repeating 
our  audit  fee  and  modified  opinion  tests  using  data  from  countries  where  litigation 
against  the  auditor  is  virtually  non-existent.  We  identify  these  countries  using  the 
“liability standard for accountants” index in La Porta et al. (2006). This index captures 
the  difficulty  in  recovering  losses  from  auditors  due  to  misleading  prospectus 
information. The risk index equals one when investors only need to prove the information 
is  misleading;  it  equals  two-thirds  when  investors  must  also  prove  reliance  on  the 
misleading accounting information; it equals one-third when investors must also prove 
auditor negligence; and zero when recovery from auditors is not possible or when intent 
or gross negligence must be proven. Our sample includes all countries with an index of 
zero or one-third with audit fee data available in the Global Vantage database for more 
than 10 observations during our sampling period 2000-2007: Germany, France, Italy, and 
Sweden.   32 
Prior studies argue that it is extremely difficult or impossible to sue outside auditors 
in all of these countries. Weber et al. (2008) argue that it is difficult for clients and 
investors to sue auditors for damages in Germany because German law requires evidence 
that the auditor acted intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth, and there is a 
relatively low cap on auditor civil liability. Piot and Janin (2007) document that the deep 
pockets argument is not valid in France because of the lower responsiveness of the civil 
law litigation system in protecting investors‟ rights. For similar reasons, Wingate (1997) 
and Choi et al. (2008) classify Italy and Sweden as countries having a low litigation risk 
for auditors. 
Test Results 
Because restatement and resignation data are not available in the Global Vantage 
database, we limit this analysis to the audit fee and modified opinion tests. We test the 
models presented in equations (3) and (4) after excluding variables not available in the 
Global Vantage database. Table 7, Panel A presents the mean values of the variables by 
country  for  the  audit  fee  model,  and  Panel  B  presents  the  Pearson  correlations.  The 
number  of  observations  (n=1,332)  is  much  smaller  than  in  our  analysis  of  US  firms 
reported in Table 3 (n=18,824), which should bias against finding our predicted result. 
We estimate CONSV by each country with all available data following the procedure 
outlined in Appendix 2.  
Table 7, Panel C presents the results from estimating the audit fee model. Column 
(2) reports that the coefficient on CONSV is significantly negative at p<0.01, consistent 
with our third hypothesis. The results for the control variables are similar to those for our 
U.S. sample. Table 7, Panels D and E report the mean values of the variables and Pearson   33 
correlations between the variables in the modified opinion test. As with our audit fee test, 
the number observations (n=2,368, including 413 modified opinions) is smaller than in 
our analysis of US firms reported in Table 4 (n=7,049, including 541 modified going 
concern opinions). Table 7, Panel F presents the results from estimating the modified 
opinion  model.  Column  (2)  reports  that  the  coefficient  on  CONSV  is  significantly 
negative at p<0.01, consistent with our fourth hypothesis.  
In summary, we continue to find that client conservatism affects audit fees and the 
issuance of modified audit opinions even in countries where auditors have essentially no 
litigation  risk.  This  indicates  that  the  effects  of  client  conservatism  on  auditor-client 
contracting are not solely explained by reduced litigation risk. 
 
VII. SUMMARY 
Because accounting conservatism is expected to curb the incidence of substandard 
financial reporting, we predict that it affects auditor-client contracting and outcomes by 
lowering auditors‟ litigation and reputation risk. Consistent with our predictions, we find 
that conservative audit clients are less likely to trigger auditor litigation or issue income-
increasing  accounting  restatements;  and  that  auditors  of  conservative  clients  receive 
lower audit fees, issue fewer going concern audit opinions, and resign less frequently. 
Importantly, we also find that the effect of conservatism on auditor reputation risk is 
independent of its effect on auditor litigation risk. Overall, our findings are consistent 
with conditional accounting conservatism being an important determinant of auditor risk 
that is reflected in auditor-client contracting and outcomes.    34 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
 
Dependent and test variables 
LITIG  =  1  if  the  auditor  is  named  as  the  defendant  in  the  lawsuit,  and  0 
otherwise; 
RESTATE  =  1 if the earnings for the firm-year or any quarter in the firm-year are 
subsequently  restated  downward,  and  0  otherwise.  In  other  words, 
RESTATE captures the misstatement year. 
LAUDIT  =  log of audit fees in thousand dollars; 
OPIN  =  1 if the firm receives a going concern opinion for the first time, and 0 
otherwise; 
RESIGN  =  1 if the auditor resigns, and 0 otherwise (dismissed); 
CONSV  =  decile rank of conservatism score (C_Score in Khan and Watts 2009),  
scaled from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating higher conservatism. 
Control variables 
Ln_Assets  =  log of total assets; 
Inventory  =  inventories deflated by total assets; 
Receivable  =  receivables deflated by total assets; 
ROA  =  income before extraordinary items deflated by total assets; 
Current  =  current assets divided by current liabilities; 
Leverage  =   total debts to assets ratio; 
Sales_Growth  =  growth in sales; 
Return  =  the compounded stock return over the fiscal year; 
Volatility  =  the standard deviation of the residual from the market model over the 
fiscal year; 
Beta  =  the slope coefficient of a regression of daily stock returns on equally 
weighted market returns over the fiscal year; 
Turnover  =  the proportion of shares traded at least once during the fiscal year, 
computed as in Shu (2000); 
Delist  =  1 if the firm is delisted because of financial difficulties within the next 
year, and 0 otherwise; 
Tech_Dummy  =  1  if  the  firm  is  in  a  high-tech  industry,  and  0  otherwise.  The 
classification of high-tech industries follows from Shu (2000); 
GCM  =  1 if the firm receives a going concern opinion, and 0 otherwise; 
BM  =  book-to-market ratio;  
Signed_DA  =  performance-adjusted  signed  discretionary  accruals  obtained  by 
subtracting from each firm‟s abnormal accrual the median abnormal 
accrual from the corresponding ROA-industry decile to which the firm 
belongs. Abnormal accrual is estimated by modified Jones model for 
each  year and  each  two-digit  SIC  code  industry  with  minimum  10 
observations; 
ProbLit  =  the probability of litigation, fitted using the parameters and variables 
in Table 3 of Shu (2000); 
Size  =  log of market capitalization; 
Loss  =   1 if firm is reporting a loss and 0 otherwise; 
BigN  =  1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 or Big 5 audit firm, and 0 otherwise; 
Merger  =  1 if the firm is engaged in a merger or acquisition, and 0 otherwise; 
Finance  =  1 if long term debt or number of shares increased by at least 10%, and 
0 otherwise;  
NSEG  =   the number of business segments; 
FOPS  =   1 if firm has a foreign operation, and 0 otherwise;   35 
Inv_Rec  =  sum of inventories and receivables, divided by beginning total assets; 
Quick  =  current assets minus inventories, divided by current liabilities; 
SPITEM  =  1 if the firm reports a special item, and 0 otherwise; 
Pension  =  1  if  the  pension  assets  or  periodic  pension  cost  is  greater  than  $1 
million, and 0 otherwise; 
Busy  =  1 if fiscal year end is December, and 0 otherwise; 
ZScore  =  Zmijewski‟s (1984) bankruptcy score; 
Ln_Age  =  natural logarithm of the age of the firm in a given year, measured as 
the number of years with return history on CRSP; 
CLeverage  =  change in Leverage during the year; 
LLoss  =  1 if the firm reports a loss for the previous year, and 0 otherwise; 
Investment  =  cash, cash equivalents, and short- and long-term investment securities 
deflated by total assets; 
Cashflow  =  operating cash flows deflated by total assets; 
Future_Finance  =  1 if long term debt or number of shares increased by at least 10% in 
the following year, and 0 otherwise;  
Asset_Growth  =   growth in assets; 
Abs_DA  =  absolute values of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals; 
Clean  =  1 if the auditor issues clean, unqualified report, and 0 otherwise; 
Tenure  =  auditor tenure in years; 
Cash  =   cash deflated by total assets; 
Disagree  =  1  if  the  8-K  filing  discloses  an  accounting  disagreement  with  the 
incumbent auditor, and 0 otherwise; 
Rep_Event  =  1 if the 8-K filing discloses a reportable event, and 0 otherwise; 
Industry 
Dummies 
=  industry membership as defined in Frankel et al. (2002). 
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Appendix 2: Estimation of Firm-year Specific Conservatism (C_Score) 
The empirical model to estimate C_Score is based on the standard Basu (1997) 
regression specification as follows: 
, 1, 2, , 3, , , 4, , , , , it t t it it it it it it it X D R D R                                                        (A1)                                                            
where i indexes the firm, t indexes time, X is income before extraordinary items scaled by 
lagged market value, R is annual returns compounded from monthly returns ending three 
month after fiscal year end; D is a binary variable that takes the value of one for firms 
with negative returns and zero otherwise, and ε is the residual.   
C_Score is derived from linear functions of three firm-specific characteristics that 
vary with conditional conservatism: size, the market-to-book ratio, and leverage. The 
timeliness of good news (β3) and the incremental timeliness of bad news relative to good 
news (β4) are specified as linear functions of the three characteristics: 
3, , 1 2 , 3 , 4 , _/ i t i t i t i t G Score Size M B Lev                        (A2a) 
4, , 1 2 , 3 , 4 , _/ i t i t i t i t C Score Size M B Lev                                  (A2b) 
G_Score is the timeliness of good news, and C_Score is the incremental timeliness of bad 
news. Size is the natural log of the market value of equity, M/B is the market-to-book 
ratio, and Lev is the sum of long term and short term debt divided by market value of 
equity. k and k, k=1-4, are constant across firms, but vary across time.   
Equations (A2a) and (A2b) are identities which are substituted into equation (A1). 
We also include the three firm characteristics separately as main effects because KW 
suggests that including them yields better accounting conservatism estimates.  Thus, we 
obtain:     37 
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Consistent with KW, we estimate equation ( A3)  by annual cross -sectional 
regressions to obtain year-specific parameters, k and k. We then substitute the k into 
equation (A2b), along with firm size (Size), market-to-book (M/B), and leverage (Lev) to 
obtain firm-year specific C_Score.
26   
                                                 
26 As in KW, we delete firm years with missing data for any of the variables used in estimation, and firm 
years with negative total assets or book value of equity. We delete firm years with price per share less than 
$1, and firms in the top and bottom one percent of earnings, returns, size, market-to-book ratio and leverage 
each year.   38 
Appendix 3: Estimation of Adjusted Conservatism (ADJ_CONSV) 
To  obtain  adjusted  conservatism  (ADJ_CONSV),  we  posit  the  following  model 
from Khan and Watts (2009, hereafter KW): 
C_Score = α0+ α1 ProbLit + α2 Volatility + α3 Cycle + α4 Age + α5 Spread                         (A4) 
+ Year Dummies + e 
where 
C_Score  =  Firm-year conservatism estimated based on Khan and Watts (2009); 
ProbLit  =  the probability of litigation, fitted using the parameters and variables 
in Table 3 of Shu (2000); 
Volatility  =   the standard deviation of the residual from the market model over the 
fiscal year; 
Cycle  =  a decreasing measure of the length of the investment cycle, defined as 
depreciation expense deflated by lagged assets; 
Age  =  the age of the firm in a given year, measured as the number of years 
with return history on CRSP; 
Spread  =   the average of the daily bid-ask spreads over the fiscal year. The daily 
spread is scaled by the mid-point of the spread, obtained from CRSP. 
 
The cross-sectional analyses in KW show that firms with a higher probability of 
litigation  (ProbLit),  longer  investment  cycle  (Cycle),  higher  idiosyncratic  uncertainty 
(Volatility), lower firm age (Age) and higher information asymmetry (Spread) are more 
conservative. Panel A below reports means of those characteristics by C_Score decile 
using  our  sample.  As  acknowledged  in  KW,  these  firm-level  characteristics  can  be 
important  omitted  variables  when  C_Score  is  an  independent  variable  in  a  multiple 
regression, because unadjusted conservatism (C_Score) is significantly correlated with 
those characteristics.  
To address this issue, we use adjusted conservatism as an alternative test variable in 
our  main  models.  We  first  estimate  the  above  pooled  cross-sectional  and  time-series 
model, using 17,672 firm-years between 1999 and 2006. Panel B shows coefficients and 
t-statistics from estimating the model. We obtain the residuals from the regression and   39 
form  deciles  of  the  residuals  for  each  year.  We  denote  this  decile  variable  as 
ADJ_CONSV and include it in our main regressions. 
To assure that ADJ_CONSV still captures Basu‟s (1997) asymmetric timeliness, we 
estimate the standard Basu regression on the pooled data within each ADJ_CONSV decile 
(similar  to  Table  5  of  KW)  and  report  results  in  Panel  C.  It  shows  that  the  rank 
correlation between the ADJ_CONSV decile and the Basu‟s asymmetric timeliness (the 
coefficient on Ret x D) is significantly positive at 0.624. The difference between the 
coefficients for the highest and lowest ADJ_CONSV deciles is significant at p<0.01. This 
result suggests that ADJ_CONSV is still effective in distinguishing between firms with 
varying  degrees  of  asymmetric  timeliness  of  bad  news  although  ADJ_CONSV  is 
orthogonal to the firm characteristics included in equation (A4).    
Panel A: Means of characteristics of C_Score deciles 
 
C_Score 
Decile  C_Score  ProbLit  Volatility  Cycle  Age  Spread 
1  -0.0101  0.0087  0.0008  0.0498  26.9943  0.0063 
2  0.0581  0.0086  0.0008  0.0513  22.5608  0.0074 
3  0.0863  0.0088  0.0009  0.0507  20.2168  0.0078 
4  0.1070  0.0074  0.0011  0.0503  19.2630  0.0090 
5  0.1266  0.0089  0.0011  0.0502  19.0062  0.0108 
6  0.1456  0.0074  0.0013  0.0480  18.3181  0.0138 
7  0.1652  0.0082  0.0014  0.0496  18.4717  0.0175 
8  0.1875  0.0094  0.0016  0.0495  18.3181  0.0228 
9  0.2176  0.0134  0.0020  0.0494  18.8559  0.0293 
10  0.3055  0.0599  0.0026  0.0494  18.3866  0.0379 
Rank Corr.    0.56
*  0.93
***  -0.56
*  -0.77
***  0.93
*** 
Hi-Lo 
(t-stat) 
0.3156
*** 
(73.74) 
0.0512
*** 
(12.05) 
0.0018
*** 
(18.26) 
-0.0004 
(-0.36) 
-8.6077
*** 
(-16.34) 
0.0316
*** 
(27.49) 
 
This panel shows means of firm characteristics variables for each C_Score decile. The sample consists of 17,672 firm-
years between 1999 and 2006. Firms are sorted annually into deciles by C_Score, and then the mean of the reported 
firm characteristics is calculated by decile. ProbLit is the probability of litigation, fitted using the parameters and 
variables in Table 3 of Shu (2000). Volatility is the standard deviation of the residual from the market model over the 
fiscal year. Cycle is a decreasing measure of the length of the investment cycle, and is defined as depreciation expense 
deflated by lagged assets. Age is the age of the firm in a given year, measured as the number of years with return 
history on CRSP. Spread is the average of the daily bid-ask spreads over the fiscal year. The daily spread is scaled by 
the mid-point of the spread, obtained from CRSP. Rank Corr. is the rank correlation between the C_Score decile and 
the sample mean of the variable, and is a measure of the  monotonicity of the ranking in the table. Hi–Lo is the 
difference between the mean values of the variable for the highest and lowest C_Score deciles. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ 
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel B: Cross-sectional regression of C_Score 
 
C_Score = α0+ α1 ProbLit + α2 Volatility + α3 Cycle + α4 Age + α5 Spread + Year Dummies + e 
 
This panel shows coefficients and t-statistics from pooled cross-sectional and time-series regression of C_Score on 
probability of litigation (ProbLit), stock return volatility (Volatility), the length of investment cycle (Cycle), firm age 
(Age), and the bid/ask spread (Spread).The sample consists of 17,672 firm-years between 1999 and 2006. We run the 
OLS regression clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ 
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Panel C: Coefficients from basic Basu regressions by ADJ_CONSV decile  
ADJ_CONSV 
decile  Intercept  D  Ret  Ret x D 
1  0.040  -0.017  -0.044  0.191 
2  0.050  -0.003  -0.036  0.213 
3  0.041  -0.009  -0.006  0.134 
4  0.040  -0.006  -0.006  0.126 
5  0.045  -0.013  -0.021  0.155 
6  0.033  0.015  0.013  0.174 
7  0.046  -0.008  -0.018  0.193 
8  0.044  0.000  -0.010  0.250 
9  0.055  -0.008  -0.017  0.233 
10  0.043  -0.026  -0.056  0.273 
Rank Corr.      0.006  0.624
** 
Hi-Lo      -0.012  0.082
*** 
(t-stat)      (-0.42)  (3.58) 
 
This panel shows coefficients from basic Basu regressions estimated by ADJ_CONSV decile. The sample consists of 
17,672  firm-years  between  1997and  2006.  Firms  are  sorted  annually  into  deciles  by  ADJ_CONSV,  and  then  the 
following pooled regression is estimated for each decile:  Xi;t = β1 + β2 Di;t + β3 Reti;t + β4 Di;t Reti;t + ei;t  
X is earnings scaled by lagged price, D is a dummy variable equal to 1 if returns (Ret) are negative, and 0 if returns are 
positive. The columns show the intercept, the dummy (D), the good news timeliness (Ret) and the Basu asymmetric 
timeliness (Ret x D) coefficients. Conservatism is increasing in the ADJ_CONSV. Rank Corr. is the rank correlation 
between the ADJ_CONSV decile and the coefficient ranking, and is a measure of the monotonicity of the ranking in the 
table. Hi–Lo is the difference between the coefficients for the highest and lowest ADJ_CONSV deciles. „**‟, and „***‟ 
denote significance at 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
Variable  Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
ProbLit  +  0.274
*** 
(11.43) 
Volatility  +  3.604
*** 
(4.94) 
Cycle  -  -0.056
** 
(-2.06) 
Age  -  -0.001
*** 
(-6.17) 
Spread  +   1.567
*** 
(10.29) 
Intercept  ?  0.113
*** 
(38.49) 
Year Dummies  ?  YES 
n    17,672 
Adj.  R
2 (%)    28.88   41 
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Table 1: Analysis of Conservatism and Auditor Litigation 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the Auditor Litigation Model 
 
 
Full Sample  Industry-matched sample 
 
LITIG=1 
(n=79) 
LITIG=0 
(n=17,882)  Difference 
LITIG=1 
(n=79) 
LITIG=0 
(n=6,092)  Difference 
 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  t-stat  Z-stat  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  t-stat  Z-stat 
CONSV  0.212  0.111  0.501  0.556  -9.52
***  -8.03
***  0.229  0.111  0.504  0.556  -7.64
***  -7.68
*** 
Ln_Assets  7.836  8.282  5.861  5.786  9.34
***  8.12
***  7.836  8.282  5.681  5.587  8.93
***  8.76
*** 
Inventory  0.117  0.030  0.141  0.097  -1.30  -2.51
***  0.117  0.030  0.123  0.050  -0.32  -0.20 
Receivable  0.203  0.176  0.178  0.152  1.19  0.80  0.203  0.176  0.197  0.165  0.28  0.22 
ROA  0.017  0.031  0.011  0.040  0.54  -1.67
*  0.017  0.031  0.000  0.035  1.51  -0.68 
Current  1.970  1.508  2.536  2.032  -3.78
***  -3.30
***  1.970  1.508  2.625  2.113  -4.34
***  -4.19
*** 
Leverage  1.805  0.514  0.673  0.337  1.63  2.84
***  1.805  0.514  0.521  0.194  1.84
*  4.80
*** 
Sales_Growth  0.173  0.110  0.134  0.082  0.90  1.21  0.173  0.110  0.120  0.082  1.32  1.42 
Return  -0.018  -0.101  -0.049  -0.078  0.59  -0.20  -0.018  -0.101  -0.059  -0.087  0.77  -0.49 
Volatility  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  1.37  0.09  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.001  2.68
***  1.85
* 
Beta  1.125  1.075  0.808  0.736  3.90
***  4.02
***  1.125  1.075  0.897  0.851  2.79
***  2.60
*** 
Turnover  0.809  0.838  0.636  0.672  8.00
***  5.95
***  0.809  0.838  0.665  0.712  6.63
***  4.83
*** 
Delist  0.013  0.000  0.009  0.000  0.27  0.31  0.013  0.000  0.010  0.000  0.25  0.28 
Tech_Dummy  0.380  0.000  0.246  0.000  2.76
***  2.76
***  0.380  0.000  0.411  0.000  -0.57  -0.57 
GCM  0.025  0.000  0.014  0.000  0.65  0.88  0.025  0.000  0.013  0.000  0.66  0.90 
BM  0.411  0.328  0.626  0.502  -7.04
***  -4.65
***  0.411  0.328  0.601  0.485  -6.17
***  -4.11
*** 
Signed_DA  0.003  0.001  0.001  0.000  1.81
*  0.43  0.003  0.001  -0.002  -0.001  4.31
***  2.25
** 
The full sample for the auditor litigation model consists of 79 unique cases of auditor litigation and 17,882 control firm-year observations that are all other firms not being involved 
in auditor litigation for the period 2000-2007. In the industry-matched sample, 6,092 control firm-year observations are all other firms that are in the same Fama and French 48 
industries. This panel provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the model for litigation and control sample, along with mean t-tests and median Wilcoxon z-tests of 
differences across the two groups.  Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-
tailed), respectively.   46 
Table 1: Analysis of Conservatism and Auditor Litigation (continued)  
Panel B: Pearson’s Correlations  
 
  LITIG  CONSV  Ln_Assets  Inventory  Receivable  ROA  Current  Leverage  Sales_Growth  Return  Volatility  Beta  Turnover  Delist  Tech_Dummy  GCM  BM  Signed_DA 
LITIG  1.00 
                                 
CONSV  -0.10  1.00 
                               
Ln_Assets  0.13  -0.60  1.00 
                             
Inventory  0.00  0.14  0.00  1.00 
                           
Receivable  0.00  0.11  -0.13  0.01  1.00 
                         
ROA  0.01  -0.20  0.30  0.13  0.16  1.00 
                       
Current  -0.04  0.02  -0.22  -0.03  -0.15  -0.05  1.00 
                     
Leverage  0.12  0.08  0.18  0.06  -0.03  -0.03  -0.22  1.00 
                   
Sales_Growth  0.02  -0.08  0.03  0.03  0.12  0.07  -0.04  0.01  1.00 
                 
Return  0.01  -0.01  0.14  0.00  0.06  0.23  -0.01  -0.06  0.11  1.00 
               
Volatility  -0.02  0.29  -0.46  -0.02  0.02  -0.39  0.03  0.02  -0.05  -0.16  1.00 
             
Beta  0.04  -0.37  0.30  -0.15  -0.15  -0.03  0.18  -0.12  0.04  0.09  -0.07  1.00 
           
Turnover  0.06  -0.45  0.37  -0.08  -0.08  0.06  0.10  -0.08  0.13  0.11  -0.05  0.58  1.00 
         
Delist  0.00  0.07  -0.09  0.01  0.02  -0.10  -0.04  0.05  -0.02  -0.09  0.14  -0.06  -0.06  1.00 
       
Tech_Dummy  -0.01  -0.05  -0.19  -0.30  -0.03  -0.14  0.18  -0.17  0.00  -0.01  0.15  0.24  0.18  -0.01  1.00 
     
GCM  0.01  0.06  -0.10  -0.03  -0.03  -0.16  -0.03  0.03  -0.01  -0.09  0.13  -0.04  -0.04  0.07  0.00  1.00 
   
BM  -0.05  0.38  -0.08  0.18  -0.03  -0.07  0.04  0.01  -0.15  -0.35  0.13  -0.26  -0.29  0.07  -0.16  0.03  1.00 
 
Signed_DA  0.03  0.02  0.16  0.19  -0.13  -0.06  -0.15  0.20  -0.11  0.02  -0.12  -0.11  -0.10  0.00  -0.30  -0.01  0.14  1.00 
 
This panel provides the Pearson‟s correlation between variables used in the regression model that contains the industry-matched sample. The variables used in the regression model 
are as defined in Appendix 1.   47 
Table 1: Analysis of Conservatism and Auditor Litigation (continued)  
 
Panel C: Logistic Regression of Auditor Litigation Model 
 
LITIG = α0+ α1 CONSV + α2 Ln_Assets + α3 Inventory + α4 Receivable + α5 ROA 
              + α6 Current + α7 Leverage + α8 Sales_Growth + α9 Return + α10 Volatility + α11 Beta 
              + α12 Turnover+ α13 Delist+ α14 Tech_Dummy+ α15 GCM + α16 BM + α17 Signed_DA + e 
 
 
Variable  Predicted 
Sign 
Full Sample  Industry-matched Sample 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
CONSV  -    -1.696
*** 
(8.82) 
  -2.155
*** 
(10.85) 
Ln_Assets  +  0.620
*** 
(34.77) 
0.507
*** 
(19.98) 
0.670
*** 
(42.95) 
0.586
*** 
(25.43) 
Inventory  +  0.030 
(0.00) 
0.058 
(0.00) 
0.466 
(0.20) 
0.627 
(0.40) 
Receivable  +  1.817
*** 
(6.68) 
1.880
*** 
(7.09) 
1.599
** 
(3.76) 
1.237
 
(2.01) 
ROA  -  -0.807
** 
(4.68) 
-0.985
*** 
(8.97) 
-1.032
** 
(4.44) 
-0.554 
(1.53) 
Current  -  -0.098 
(0.77) 
-0.136 
(1.35) 
-0.067 
(0.32) 
-0.161 
(1.96) 
Leverage  +  0.085
** 
(4.46) 
0.125
** 
(3.88) 
0.114 
(2.22) 
0.249
*** 
(10.67) 
Sales_Growth  +  0.010 
(0.00) 
0.007 
(0.00) 
0.183 
(0.30) 
0.030 
(0.01) 
Return  -  -0.322 
(0.52) 
-0.059 
(0.02) 
-0.320 
(0.71) 
-0.014 
(0.00) 
Volatility  +  133.3
*** 
(10.28) 
142.6
*** 
(9.97) 
131.0
*** 
(6.40) 
134.8
*** 
(6.43) 
Beta  +  0.351 
(0.69) 
0.437 
(1.05) 
0.197 
(0.23) 
0.312 
(0.59) 
Turnover  +  1.672 
(2.43) 
1.513 
(1.91) 
1.431 
(1.83) 
2.025
* 
(3.30) 
Delist  +  0.424 
(0.07) 
0.408 
(0.06) 
1.144 
(0.67) 
0.781 
(0.29) 
Tech_Dummy  +  0.772
** 
(4.02) 
0.677
* 
(2.84) 
0.059 
(0.02) 
-0.108 
(0.07) 
GCM  +  1.132 
(2.29) 
1.372
* 
(2.79) 
1.386
* 
(2.98) 
1.002 
(1.47) 
BM  ?  -1.254
** 
(5.08) 
-0.645 
(1.84) 
-1.382
*** 
(6.29) 
-0.591 
(1.45) 
Signed_DA  +  0.001 
(0.05) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
0.138
* 
(3.57) 
0.187
** 
(4.90) 
Intercept  ?  -11.313
*** 
(59.90) 
-10.182
*** 
(43.67) 
-10.051
*** 
(47.12) 
-9.434
*** 
(38.98) 
 
         
n    17,961  17,961  6,171  6,171 
Wald-statistic    159.78
***  135.15
***  108.98
***  111.51
** 
Pseudo R
2 (%)    15.69  16.80  18.88  18.61 
Percent 
Concordant 
  78.1  79.1  81.2  81.5 
The variables used in the regression model are as defined in Appendix 1. We run the logistic regression clustered by 
firm (Petersen, 2009). For each variable, we report the regression coefficient, followed by the robust Wald statistic in 
parentheses. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively.   
     48 
Table 2: Analysis of Conservatism and Restatements 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the Restatement Model 
 
Variable 
RESTATE=1 
(n=914) 
RESTATE=0 
(n=14,853)  Difference 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  t-stat  z-stat 
CONSV  0.419  0.444  0.469  0.444  -5.28
***  -4.59
*** 
ProbLit  0.011  0.009  0.010  0.006  3.23
***  7.47
*** 
SIZE  6.226  6.317  5.859  5.815  7.32
***  7.02
*** 
Volatility  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  -9.17
***  -4.19
*** 
BM  0.555  0.478  0.592  0.478  -2.66
***  -1.16 
Leverage  0.485  0.207  0.461  0.165  0.90  1.72
* 
ROA  0.020  0.041  0.001  0.038  4.25
***  1.33 
Loss  0.243  0.000  0.276  0.000  -2.21
**  -2.21
** 
BigN  0.870  1.000  0.830  1.000  3.48
***  3.16
*** 
Merger  0.216  0.000  0.200  0.000  1.15  1.15 
Finance  0.363  0.000  0.346  0.000  1.05  1.05 
NSEG  2.121  1.000  2.150  1.000  -0.52  -0.85 
FOPS  0.194  0.000  0.210  0.000  -1.19  -1.19 
Inv_Rec  0.272  0.237  0.272  0.245  -0.04  -0.18 
Return  0.045  -0.050  0.030  -0.042  0.88  -0.09 
The  restatement  test  includes  15,767  firm-year  observations  for  the  period  2000-2007.  Of  these  firm-year 
observations,  a  total  of  914  observations  were  misstated  and  subsequently  restated.  This  panel  provides  the 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the model by restatement type, along with mean t-tests and median 
Wilcoxon z-tests of differences across the two groups. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 
1.  „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 2: Analysis of Conservatism and Restatements (continued) 
Panel B: Pearson’s Correlations  
 
  RESTATE  CONSV  ProbLit  SIZE  Volatility  BM  Leverage  ROA  Loss  BigN  Merger  Finance  NSEG  FOPS  Inv_Rec  Returns 
RESTATE  1.00 
                              CONSV  -0.04  1.00 
                            ProbLit  0.02  -0.39  1.00 
                          SIZE  0.05  -0.41  0.53  1.00 
                        Volatility  0.05  0.25  -0.21  -0.45  1.00 
                      BM  -0.02  0.41  -0.13  -0.43  0.17  1.00 
                    Leverage  0.01  0.07  0.24  0.11  -0.06  0.01  1.00 
                  ROA  0.03  -0.16  0.20  0.28  -0.37  -0.03  0.00  1.00 
                Loss  -0.02  0.20  -0.20  -0.27  0.34  0.03  -0.01  -0.53  1.00 
              BigN  0.03  -0.35  0.20  0.37  -0.10  -0.03  0.09  0.04  -0.07  1.00 
            Merger  0.01  -0.12  0.14  0.15  -0.06  -0.04  0.06  0.05  -0.09  0.06  1.00 
          Finance  0.01  -0.04  0.07  0.07  0.05  -0.10  0.11  -0.11  0.02  0.00  0.23  1.00 
        NSEG  0.00  -0.06  0.17  0.17  -0.12  0.04  0.10  0.09  -0.11  0.05  0.09  0.02  1.00 
      FOPS  0.01  -0.11  0.18  0.15  -0.08  -0.06  -0.04  0.05  -0.03  0.06  0.06  -0.02  0.02  1.00 
    Inv_Rec  0.00  0.23  0.16  -0.24  0.06  0.17  -0.13  0.18  -0.15  -0.11  -0.05  -0.05  0.04  0.08  1.00 
  Return  -0.01  0.04  -0.04  0.20  -0.02  -0.30  -0.02  0.18  -0.04  0.03  0.01  0.09  0.02  0.01  0.02  1.00 
This panel provides the Pearson‟s correlation between variables used in the regression model. The variables used in the regression model are as defined in Appendix 1.   50 
Table 2: Analysis of Conservatism and Restatements (continued) 
Panel C: Logistic Regression of Restatement Model  
 
RESTATE = a0 + a1 CONSV + a2 ProbLit + a3 Size + a4 Volatility + a5 BM + a6 Leverage + a7 ROA  
  + a8 LOSS + a9 BigN + a10 MERGER + a11 FINANCE + a12 NSEG + a13 FOPS + a14 Inv_Rec  
  + a15 Return + Year Dummies + e 
 
 
Variable  Predicted 
Sign 
Full Sample Analyses  Subsample Analyses 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Low Shu‟s 
score 
(4) 
Low litigious 
industry 
CONSV  -  -0.835
*** 
(11.12) 
-0.833
*** 
(11.06) 
-1.908
** 
(3.93) 
-0.926
*** 
(6.76) 
ProbLit  +    -1.412 
(0.17) 
940.6
** 
(3.04) 
0.810 
(0.04) 
Size  ?  -0.028 
(0.45) 
-0.022 
(0.25) 
-0.001 
(0.48) 
-0.075 
(1.54) 
Volatility  +  70.550
* 
(3.44) 
68.748
* 
(3.31) 
-179.6
 
(1.63) 
11.890
 
(0.06) 
BM  ?  0.299
*** 
(6.88) 
0.301
*** 
(7.01) 
0.600 
(1.97) 
0.463
*** 
(9.93) 
Leverage  +  0.101
** 
(4.89) 
0.106
** 
(4.95) 
0.633 
(0.58) 
0.055 
(0.57) 
ROA  -  0.214 
(0.60) 
0.216 
(0.61) 
2.040
** 
(4.52) 
0.076 
(0.03) 
Loss  +  -0.016 
(0.03) 
-0.016 
(0.03) 
1.842
*** 
(15.74)
  
0.064 
(0.22) 
BigN  -  0.151 
(1.80) 
0.151 
(1.80) 
-0.620
* 
(3.46) 
0.151 
(1.80) 
Merger  +  0.038 
(0.19) 
0.040 
(0.22) 
-0.319 
(0.15) 
0.330
*** 
(9.32) 
Finance  +  0.097 
(1.65) 
0.098 
(1.67) 
0.265 
(0.38) 
0.012 
(0.01) 
NSEG  +  -0.033 
(2.14) 
-0.033 
(2.10) 
-0.461
* 
(3.18) 
0.030 
(1.10) 
FOPS  +  0.220
*** 
(6.14) 
0.217
** 
(5.93) 
12.812
*** 
(17.56) 
0.061 
(0.29) 
Inv_Rec  +  0.416
** 
(4.03) 
0.447
** 
(3.89) 
1.604 
(1.01) 
0.244 
(0.50) 
Return  -  -0.230
** 
(5.36) 
-0.225
** 
(5.03) 
-0.355
** 
(1.17) 
-0.290
** 
(3.76) 
Intercept  ?  -2.769
*** 
(64.72) 
-2.809
*** 
(64.36) 
-4.122
*** 
(14.95) 
-2.807
*** 
(33.32) 
Year  
Dummies    YES  YES  YES  YES 
n    15,767  15,767  1,282  9,409 
Wald-statistic    185.36  185.56  3658.93  83.08 
Pseudo R
2 (%)    3.90  3.90  4.00  3.33 
Percent Concordant    62.5  62.5  81.08  61.38 
 
The variables used in the regression model are as defined in Appendix 1. In column (3), low Shu‟s score subsample 
consists of firms included in the bottom 10 percentile of annual litigation score based on Shu (2000) among all firms 
listed in the Compustat. In column (4), low litigious industry subsample consists of firms operating in a less litigious 
industry. Litigious industries are industries with SIC codes 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 
7370, following LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008). We run the logistic regression clustered by firm (Petersen, 
2009). For each variable, we report the regression coefficient, followed by the robust Wald statistic in parentheses. To 
conserve  space,  we  do  not  report  the  coefficient  estimates  for  the  year  dummies.    „*‟,  „**‟,  and  „***‟  denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively.   51 
Table 3: Analysis of Conservatism and Audit Fees 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the Audit Fee Model 
 
Variable 
High Audit Fees 
(n=9,412) 
Low Audit Fees 
(n=9,412)  Difference 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  t-stat  z-stat 
CONSV  0.401  0.333  0.597  0.667  -44.27
***  -42.14
*** 
ProbLit  0.017  0.013  0.005  0.003  72.98
***  82.90
*** 
Size  6.976  6.968  4.527  4.603  99.70
***  85.15
*** 
Quick  1.871  1.353  3.086  1.798  -20.63
***  -24.06
*** 
Loss  0.217  0.000  0.365  0.000  -22.58
***  -22.28
*** 
ROA  0.031  0.044  -0.028  0.029  24.18
***  18.69
*** 
Leverage  0.214  0.206  0.154  0.090  23.80
***  26.57
*** 
Inv_Rec  0.253  0.234  0.283  0.251  -11.15
***  -6.05
*** 
BM  0.504  0.437  0.658  0.519  -23.99
***  -17.13
*** 
NSEG  2.544  2.000  1.898  1.000  26.91
***  22.13
*** 
SPITEM  0.737  1.000  0.484  0.000  36.75
***  35.50
*** 
FOPS  0.295  0.000  0.131  0.000  28.10
***  27.53
*** 
Merger  0.259  0.000  0.148  0.000  19.04
***  18.86
*** 
Finance  0.365  0.000  0.336  0.000  4.09
***  4.09
*** 
Pension  0.043  0.000  0.109  0.000  -17.12
***  -16.99
*** 
BigN  0.936  1.000  0.750  1.000  36.29
***  35.08
*** 
GCM  0.006  0.000  0.019  0.000  -7.99
***  -7.97
*** 
Busy  0.690  1.000  0.614  1.000  11.07
***  11.04
*** 
 
The sample for the audit fee model consists of 18,824 firm-year observations for the period 2000-2007. We split the 
sample into high and low audit fees groups. This panel provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
model by audit fee group, along with mean t-tests and median Wilcoxon z-tests of differences across the two groups.  
Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ denote significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 3: Analysis of Conservatism and Audit Fees (continued)  
Panel B: Pearson’s Correlations  
 
  LAUDIT  CONSV  ProbLit  Size  Quick  Loss  ROA  Leverage  Inv_Rec  BM  NSEG  SPITEM  FOPS  Merger  Finance  Pension  BigN  GCM  Busy 
LAUDIT  1.00 
                                    CONSV  -0.38  1.00 
                                  ProbLit  0.60  -0.30  1.00 
                                Size  0.73  -0.38  0.62  1.00 
                              Quick  -0.19  -0.03  -0.20  -0.34  1.00 
                            Loss  -0.18  0.15  -0.19  -0.39  0.15  1.00 
                          ROA  0.18  -0.13  0.20  0.45  -0.12  -0.64  1.00 
                        Leverage  0.20  0.15  0.25  0.30  -0.23  -0.03  0.03  1.00 
                      Inv_Rec  -0.08  0.19  0.16  0.11  -0.20  -0.13  0.18  -0.09  1.00 
                    BM  -0.19  0.40  -0.12  -0.04  -0.04  0.13  -0.03  0.10  0.17 
                    NSEG  0.26  -0.02  0.18  0.28  -0.13  -0.10  0.10  0.16  0.03  0.04  1.00 
                SPITEM  0.31  -0.09  0.19  0.23  -0.07  0.12  -0.06  0.11  -0.07  0.03  0.09  1.00 
              FOPS  0.25  -0.09  0.17  0.12  -0.03  -0.03  0.05  -0.04  0.08  -0.06  0.01  0.14  1.00 
            Merger  0.16  -0.11  0.14  0.13  -0.06  -0.05  0.05  0.10  -0.04  -0.04  0.08  0.09  0.05  1.00 
          Finance  0.03  -0.04  0.07  0.00  -0.03  0.03  -0.10  0.18  -0.06  -0.09  0.02  -0.02  -0.02  0.22  1.00 
        Pension  -0.14  0.05  -0.12  -0.22  0.07  0.18  -0.17  -0.12  -0.04  -0.03  -0.11  -0.03  -0.05  -0.03  0.00  1.00 
      BigN  0.31  -0.24  0.20  0.34  -0.03  -0.06  0.04  0.09  -0.11  -0.03  0.07  0.13  0.06  0.06  0.00  -0.06  1.00 
    GCM  -0.06  0.06  -0.01  -0.11  0.00  0.13  -0.18  0.02  -0.01  0.02  -0.03  0.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.02  0.06  -0.04  1.00 
  Busy  0.09  -0.05  0.06  0.00  0.01  0.05  -0.07  0.11  -0.18  -0.05  0.04  0.03  0.00  0.04  0.05  0.02  0.06  0.01  1.00 
This panel provides the Pearson‟s correlation between variables used in the audit fee sample. The variables used in the regression model are as defined in Appendix 1. 
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Table 3: Analysis of Conservatism and Audit Fees (continued) 
 
Panel C: OLS Regression of Audit Fee Model 
 
LAUDIT =γ0 + γ1 CONSV + γ2 ProbLit + γ3 Size + γ4 Quick + γ5 Loss + γ6 ROA + γ7 Leverage 
+ γ8 Inv_Rec + γ9 BM + γ10 NSEG + γ11 SPITEM + γ12 FOPS + γ13 Merger + γ14 Finance 
+ γ15 Pension + γ16 BigN + γ17 GCM + γ18 Busy + Industry & Year Dummies + e 
 
Variable  Predicted 
Sign 
Full Sample Analyses  Subsample Analyses 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Low 
 Shu‟s score 
(4) 
Low litigious 
industry 
CONSV  -  -0.221
*** 
(-8.48) 
-0.168
*** 
(-6.90) 
-0.283
*** 
(-3.44) 
-0.140
*** 
(-5.01) 
ProbLit  +    14.261
*** 
(10.37)
  
257.402
*** 
(3.13) 
11.722
*** 
(7.51) 
Size  +  0.445
*** 
(54.53) 
0.395
*** 
(43.24) 
0.104
*** 
(5.93) 
0.435
*** 
(43.34) 
Quick  -  0.005
* 
(1.80) 
0.004 
(1.56) 
0.001 
(0.41) 
0.006 
(1.56) 
Loss  +  0.109
*** 
(6.15) 
0.104
*** 
(6.16) 
0.097
** 
(2.02) 
0.123
*** 
(6.02) 
ROA  -  -0.924
*** 
(-16.14) 
-0.837
*** 
(-15.57) 
-0.195
*** 
(-2.52) 
-0.858
*** 
(-11.07) 
Leverage  +  0.022
*** 
(3.55) 
0.009
* 
(1.81) 
-0.128
* 
(-1.65) 
0.004
* 
(0.80) 
Inv_Rec  +  -0.474
*** 
(-8.78) 
-0.637
*** 
(-12.23)
 *** 
-0.663
*** 
(-4.13) 
-0.773
*** 
(-12.08) 
BM  -  -0.025
* 
(-1.65) 
-0.008 
(-0.53) 
0.121
*** 
(2.94)
  
-0.027 
(-1.49)
  
NSEG  +  0.047
*** 
(8.70) 
0.047
*** 
(8.94) 
0.016 
(0.75) 
0.035
*** 
(6.06) 
SPITEM  +  0.167
*** 
(13.18) 
0.158
*** 
(12.90)
 *** 
0.176
*** 
(4.84) 
0.148
*** 
(10.61) 
FOPS  +  0.247
*** 
(12.18) 
0.234
*** 
(11.85) 
0.163
*** 
(2.47) 
0.231
*** 
(10.07) 
Merger  +  0.096
*** 
(6.92) 
0.079
*** 
(5.81) 
0.082 
(1.31) 
0.084
*** 
(5.36) 
Finance  +  0.024
** 
(2.20) 
0.006 
(0.56) 
0.071
* 
(1.82) 
0.005 
(0.39) 
Pension  +  0.020 
(0.76) 
0.011 
(0.43) 
0.088 
(1.58) 
0.009 
(0.28) 
BigN  +  0.346
*** 
(13.50) 
0.343
*** 
(13.88) 
0.530
*** 
(10.24) 
0.300
*** 
(10.65) 
GCM  +  0.141
** 
(2.39) 
0.071 
(1.26) 
-0.118 
(-1.26) 
0.132
** 
(2.02) 
Busy  +  0.134
*** 
(7.25) 
0.121
*** 
(6.71) 
0.131
*** 
(2.61) 
0.106
*** 
(4.91) 
Intercept  ?  10.880
*** 
(162.01) 
11.029
*** 
(171.28) 
11.683
*** 
(85.37) 
10.927
*** 
(169.93) 
Industry & Year  
Dummies    YES  YES  YES  YES 
n    18,824  18,824  1,419  13,576 
Adj R
2 (%)    78.83  79.76  54.44  80.93 
 
The variables used in the regression model are as defined in Appendix 1. In column (3), low Shu‟s score subsample 
consists of firms included in the bottom 10 percentile of annual litigation score based on Shu (2000) among all firms   54 
listed in the Compustat. In column (4), low litigious industry subsample consists of firms operating in a less litigious 
industry. Litigious industries are industries with SIC codes 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 
7370, following LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008). The industry dummies are as defined in Frankel et al. (2002). 
We run the OLS regression clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). For each variable, we report the regression coefficient, 
followed by the robust t-statistic in parentheses. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates for the 
industry  and  year  dummies.  „*‟,  „**‟,  and  „***‟  denote  significance  at  10%,  5%,  and  1%  levels  (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
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Table 4: Analysis of Conservatism and Going Concern Opinions 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the Going Concern Opinion Model 
 
Variable 
OPIN=1 
(n=541) 
OPIN=0 
(n=6,508)  Difference 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  t-stat  z-stat 
CONSV  0.488  0.444  0.544  0.444  -1.46  -1.28 
ProbLit  0.008  0.004  0.007  0.003  1.86
*  1.96
** 
Zscore  -0.700  -1.711  -3.226  -3.459  13.18
***  22.44
*** 
Size  3.338  3.161  4.687  4.648  -20.62
***  -18.82
*** 
Ln_Age  2.394  2.303  2.499  2.398  -3.69
***  -3.78
*** 
Beta  0.702  0.586  0.877  0.806  -5.94
***  -6.09
*** 
Return  -0.354  -0.496  -0.110  -0.232  -9.93
***  -13.37
*** 
Volatility  0.005  0.004  0.003  0.002  14.21
***  19.71
*** 
Leverage  0.809  0.302  0.532  0.147  3.78
***  2.87
*** 
Cleverage  0.156  0.034  0.110  0.000  0.73  3.49
*** 
LLoss  0.834  1.000  0.655  1.000  10.45
***  8.47
*** 
Investment  0.214  0.087  0.300  0.209  -7.32
***  -8.33
*** 
Cashflow  -0.290  -0.067  -0.031  -0.011  -2.32
**  -13.39
*** 
Future_Finance  0.421  0.000  0.481  0.000  -2.68
***  -2.68
*** 
BigN  0.643  1.000  0.769  1.000  -5.93
***  -6.60
*** 
BM  0.586  0.353  0.756  0.560  -2.62
***  -7.57
*** 
 
The going concern test includes 7,049 firm-year observations with financial distress for the period 2000-2007. Of 
these firm-year observations, a total of 541 firms received a going concern opinion for the first time. We define 
financially distressed firms to be firms that reports either negative net income or negative operating cash flows during 
the current fiscal year. This panel provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the model by opinion 
type, along with mean t-tests and median Wilcoxon z-tests of differences across the two groups.  Detailed definitions 
of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-
tailed), respectively. 
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Table 4: Analysis of Conservatism and Going Concern Opinions (continued) 
 
Panel B: Pearson’s Correlations  
 
  OPIN  CONSV  ProbLit  Zscore  Size  Ln_Age  Beta  Return  Volatility  Leverage  Cleverage  LLoss  Investment  Cashflow  Future_Finance  BigN  BM 
OPIN  1.00 
                                CONSV  -0.02  1.00 
                              ProbLit  0.04  -0.02  1.00 
                            Zscore  0.37  0.14  0.09  1.00 
                          Size  -0.22  -0.41  0.40  -0.09  1.00 
                        Ln_Age  -0.06  0.08  0.20  -0.06  0.11  1.00 
                      Beta  -0.06  -0.53  0.23  -0.01  0.53  -0.09  1.00 
                    Return  -0.11  0.06  -0.06  -0.11  0.29  -0.01  0.08  1.00 
                  Volatility  0.25  0.23  -0.13  0.18  -0.42  -0.22  -0.07  0.01  1.00 
                Leverage  0.04  0.07  0.14  0.11  0.02  0.08  -0.06  -0.03  -0.01  1.00 
              Cleverage  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.08  0.00  0.00  -0.02  -0.03  -0.01  0.73  1.00 
            LLoss  0.11  0.02  -0.19  0.14  -0.08  -0.21  0.08  0.08  0.17  -0.07  -0.01  1.00 
          Investment  -0.08  -0.28  -0.31  -0.10  0.11  -0.27  0.23  0.10  -0.01  -0.19  -0.05  0.30  1.00 
        Cashflow  -0.03  -0.01  0.04  -0.02  0.05  0.03  0.01  0.00  -0.02  0.02  0.00  -0.02  -0.04  1.00 
      Future_Finance  -0.04  0.00  0.04  -0.02  0.07  0.04  -0.02  0.15  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02  -0.06  -0.12  0.00  1.00 
    BigN  -0.08  -0.28  0.14  0.01  0.32  -0.08  0.23  0.04  -0.05  0.03  0.02  -0.01  0.10  0.01  -0.04  1.00 
  BM  -0.04  0.21  -0.06  -0.20  -0.27  0.03  -0.18  -0.20  0.07  0.10  0.02  -0.12  -0.18  0.02  -0.13  0.02  1.00 
This panel provides the Pearson‟s correlation between variables used in the regression model for the distressed sample. The variables used in the regression model are as defined in 
Appendix 1.   57 
Table 4: Analysis of Conservatism and Going Concern Opinions (continued) 
 
Panel C: Logistic Regression of Going Concern Opinion Model 
 
OPIN = λ + λ1 CONSV + λ2 ProbLit + λ3 ZScore + λ4 Size + λ5 Ln_Age + λ6 Beta + λ7 Return 
             + λ8 Volatility + λ9 Leverage + λ10 CLeverage + λ11 LLoss + λ12 Investment + λ13 Cashflow 
             + λ14 Future_Finance + λ15 BigN + λ16 BM + Year Dummies + e     
 
Variable  Predicted 
Sign 
Full Distressed  
Sample Analyses  Subsample Analyses 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Low Shu‟s 
score 
(4) 
Low litigious 
industry 
CONSV  - 
-1.190
*** 
(12.99) 
-1.484
*** 
(19.81) 
-1.958
* 
(2.76) 
-1.157
*** 
(11.62) 
ProbLit  + 
  31.376
*** 
(13.16) 
1015.5
* 
(4.81)
  
30.405
*** 
(9.69) 
ZScore  + 
0.192
*** 
(174.09) 
0.484
*** 
(163.34) 
0.934
*** 
(55.22) 
0.422
*** 
(72.97) 
Size  -  -0.601
*** 
(32.01) 
-0.728
*** 
(50.49) 
-0.298 
(0.60) 
-0.647
*** 
(23.52) 
Ln_Age  - 
0.108 
(0.74) 
0.084 
(0.46) 
-0.031 
(0.01) 
0.036 
(0.05) 
Beta  + 
0.026 
(0.05) 
-0.056 
(0.22) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.133 
(0.75) 
Return  -  0.046 
(0.10) 
0.199 
(2.46) 
0.206 
(0.84) 
0.009 
(0.01) 
Volatility  + 
65.474
*** 
(18.35) 
60.640
*** 
(15.81) 
33.301
* 
(2.37) 
85.785
*** 
(21.75) 
Leverage  + 
0.154
*** 
(13.22) 
0.145
*** 
(11.04) 
1.132
** 
(4.12) 
0.146
*** 
(7.36) 
CLeverage  +  -0.138
*** 
(10.23) 
-0.131
*** 
(8.86) 
0.072 
(0.14) 
-0.118
** 
(5.06) 
LLoss  + 
0.677
*** 
(21.66) 
0.745
*** 
(25.16) 
0.652 
(0.73) 
0.741
*** 
(18.67) 
Investment  - 
-1.481
*** 
(19.38) 
-1.166
*** 
(11.56) 
-0.330 
(0.21) 
-1.761
*** 
(11.09) 
Cashflow  -  -0.303
*** 
(8.24) 
-0.289
*** 
(8.47) 
-0.385 
(0.45) 
-0.175
*** 
(1.99) 
Future_Finance  -  -0.157 
(1.83) 
-0.150 
(1.64) 
-0.082 
(0.09) 
-0.301
** 
(4.06) 
BigN  +  -0.172 
(1.14) 
-0.198 
(1.50) 
-0.822
* 
(3.59) 
-0.162 
(0.70) 
BM  ?  -0.001 
(0.01) 
0.018 
(0.04) 
-0.650 
(0.48) 
-0.051 
(0.48) 
Intercept  ?  1.263
* 
(2.70) 
1.751
** 
(5.74) 
-0.735 
(0.09) 
1.426 
(2.17) 
Year Dummies  ?  YES  YES  YES  YES 
           
n    7,049  7,049  1,306  4,506 
Wald-statistic    462.56
***  491.92
***  173.91
***  293.23
*** 
Pseudo R
2 (%)    32.64  33.53  50.69  31.37 
Percent Concordant    84.6  85.5  91.6  84.6 
 
The variables used in the regression model are as defined in Appendix 1. In column (3), low Shu‟s score subsample 
consists of distressed firms included in the bottom 10 percentile of annual litigation score based on Shu (2000) among 
all  firms  listed  in  the  Compustat.  In  column  (4),  low  litigious  industry  subsample  consists  of  distressed  firms   58 
operating  in  a  less litigious industry.  Litigious industries  are industries  with SIC  codes 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 
3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370, following LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008). For each variable, we report the 
regression coefficient, followed by the robust Wald statistic in parentheses. To conserve space, we do not report the 
coefficient estimates for the industry and year dummies. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels (two-tailed), respectively.   59 
Table 5: Analysis of Conservatism and Auditor Resignations 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the Auditor Resignation Model 
 
Variable 
RESIGN=1 
(n=300) 
RESIGN=0 
(n=1,636)  Difference 
 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  t-stat  z-stat 
CONSV  0.507  0.556  0.498  0.444  0.42  0.42 
ProbLit  0.010  0.006  0.008  0.004  3.12
***  2.62
*** 
Asset_Growth  0.132  0.050  0.110  0.036  0.74  0.65 
Abs_DA  0.103  0.063  0.084  0.051  2.24
**  2.89
*** 
Inv_Rec  0.297  0.263  0.283  0.257  1.09  0.78 
GCM  0.053  0.000  0.024  0.000  2.13
**  2.74
*** 
Clean  0.643  1.000  0.620  1.000  0.77  0.77 
Tenure  7.167  5.000  10.719  8.000  -7.82
***  -6.95
*** 
ROA  -0.067  0.007  -0.018  0.028  -3.35
***  -3.89
*** 
Loss  0.470  0.000  0.331  0.000  4.65
***  4.62
*** 
Levrage  0.621  0.231  0.434  0.336  3.11
***  -0.76 
Cash  0.138  0.080  0.119  0.063  1.99
**  2.77
*** 
Disagree  0.020  0.000  0.010  0.000  1.21  1.53 
Rep_Event  0.307  0.000  0.109  0.000  7.13
***  9.09
*** 
BigN  0.687  1.000  0.880  1.000  -6.89
***  -8.39
*** 
Ln_Assets  5.032  4.763  5.536  5.462  -4.54
***  -4.62
*** 
Merger  0.187  0.000  0.211  0.000  -0.95  -0.95 
BM  0.549  0.463  0.649  0.530  -3.68
***  -3.34
*** 
 
 
For the auditor resignation model, we identify 1,936 firms where auditors are changed for the period 2000-2007. We 
exclude former Andersen clients to avoid a potential confounding effect on our results. Of these auditor changes, 300 
cases represent auditor resignation sample while the remaining changes are initiated by clients. This panel provides 
the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the model by auditor switch type, along with mean t-tests and median 
Wilcoxon z-tests of differences across the two groups. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 
1.  „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 5: Analysis of Conservatism and Auditor Resignations (continued)  
Panel B: Pearson’s Correlations  
 
  RESIGN  CONSV  ProbLit Asset_Growth  Abs_DA  Inv_Rec  GCM  Clean Tenure  ROA  Loss  Levrage  Cash Disagree  Reportable  BigN  Ln_Assets  Merger  BM 
RESIGN  1.00 
                                    CONSV  0.01  1.00 
                                  ProbLit  0.06   -0.34  1.00 
                                Asset_Growth  0.02  -0.09  0.04  1.00 
                              Abs_DA  0.05  -0.02  -0.07  0.22  1.00 
                            Inv_Rec  0.02  0.25  0.14  -0.07  0.01  1.00 
                          GCM  0.06  0.08  0.01  -0.05  0.06  0.02  1.00 
                        Clean  0.02  0.04  -0.13  0.06  0.02  0.07  -0.17  1.00 
                      Tenure  -0.15  -0.13  0.21  -0.04  -0.08  0.02  -0.07  0.00  1.00 
                    ROA  -0.09  -0.09  0.17  0.08  -0.46  0.14  -0.23  0.04  0.13  1.00 
                  Loss  0.11  0.16  -0.19  -0.10  0.21  -0.10  0.16  -0.04  -0.14  -0.60  1.00 
                Levrage  0.12  0.10  0.27  0.01  -0.07  0.00  0.06  -0.06  0.05  0.05  -0.02  1.00 
              Cash  0.05  -0.08  -0.23  0.05  0.12  -0.22  0.02  0.07  -0.13  -0.21  0.17  -0.36  1.00 
            Disagree  0.03  -0.03  0.03  0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.02  0.04  1.00 
          Reportable  0.21  -0.04  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.01  -0.14  -0.10  -0.01  0.08  -0.01  0.01  0.17  1.00 
        BigN  -0.20  -0.18  0.16  -0.04  -0.05  -0.06  -0.03  -0.07  0.19  0.06  -0.03  0.07  -0.08  -0.04  -0.06  1.00 
      Ln_Assets  -0.10  -0.41  0.52  0.10  -0.11  -0.28  -0.17  -0.12  0.26  0.22  -0.30  0.09  -0.12  0.00  0.00  0.31  1.00 
    Merger  -0.02  -0.12  0.17  0.29  0.06  -0.05  -0.02  -0.01  0.02  0.02  -0.06  0.11  -0.13  0.01  0.00  0.03  0.17  1.00 
  BM  -0.07  0.37  -0.10  -0.16  -0.11  0.18  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.08  0.08  -0.19  -0.02  -0.05  0.02  -0.39  -0.05  1.00 
This panel provides the Pearson‟s correlation between variables used in the regression model for the auditor change sample. The variables used in the regression model are as defined in 
Appendix 1.   61 
Table 5: Analysis of Conservatism and Auditor Resignations (continued) 
 
Panel C: Logistic Regression of Auditor Resignation Model  
 
RESIGN = β0 + β1 CONSV + β2 ProbLit + β3 Asset_Growth + β4 Abs_DA + β5 Inv_Rec + β6 GCM 
   + β7 Clean + β8 Tenure + β9 ROA + β10 Loss + β11 Leverage + β12 Cash + β13 Disagree 
   + β14 Rep_Event + β15 BigN + β16 Ln_Assets + β17 Merger + β18 BM + e 
 
Variable  Predicted 
Sign 
Full Auditor Change 
Sample Analyses  Subsample Analyses 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Low Shu‟s 
score 
(4) 
Low litigious 
industry 
CONSV  -  -0.988
*** 
(8.70) 
-1.064
*** 
(9.57) 
-3.584
*** 
(10.32) 
-0.846
** 
(4.52) 
ProbLit  +    25.005
** 
(5.24) 
58.557 
(0.01) 
19.588
* 
(2.66) 
Asset_Growth  +  0.006 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
-0.282 
(0.34) 
0.094 
(0.35) 
Abs_DA  +  0.001
** 
(5.25) 
0.001
** 
(4.42) 
1.569
* 
(3.39) 
0.001
*** 
(11.33) 
Inv_Rec  +  0.506 
(1.79) 
0.881
** 
(4.87) 
2.164 
(0.94) 
0.629 
(1.67) 
GCM  +  0.339 
(0.81) 
0.467 
(1.53) 
0.811 
(0.36) 
0.653 
(2.45) 
Clean  -  0.243 
(2.28) 
0.225 
(1.93) 
0.730 
(0.84) 
0.200 
(1.08) 
Tenure  -  -0.037
*** 
(10.89) 
-0.036
*** 
(10.20) 
0.011 
(0.07) 
-0.037
*** 
(8.77) 
ROA  -  -0.189 
(0.27) 
-0.149 
(0.16) 
-0.586 
(0.52) 
-0.113 
(0.05) 
Loss  +  0.303
* 
(2.71) 
0.323
* 
(3.06) 
0.532 
(0.49) 
0.255 
(1.38) 
Leverage  +  0.917
*** 
(37.98) 
1.029
*** 
(43.25) 
1.488 
(1.40) 
1.078
*** 
(27.35) 
Cash  -  0.697 
(2.17) 
0.680 
(2.03) 
-1.029 
(1.00) 
0.559 
(0.69) 
Disagree  +  -0.132 
(0.04) 
-0.133 
(0.04) 
14.520
*** 
(111.89) 
0.423 
(0.35) 
Rep_Event  +  1.260
*** 
(49.66) 
1.277
*** 
(50.71) 
2.159
*** 
(6.16) 
1.174
*** 
(29.85) 
BigN  -  -0.954
*** 
(27.06) 
-0.977
*** 
(28.43) 
-1.436
** 
(5.49) 
-0.882
*** 
(17.58) 
Ln_Assets  -  -0.174
** 
(5.31) 
-0.101 
(1.66) 
-0.335 
(0.87) 
-0.167
** 
(3.69) 
Merger  ?  -0.174 
(0.75) 
-0.138 
(0.47) 
-0.138 
(0.02) 
-0.066 
(0.07) 
BM  ?  -0.493
*** 
(8.16)
  
-0.455
*** 
(7.01)
  
-0.122 
(0.04)
  
-0.381
** 
(4.24)
  
Intercept  ?  -0.089 
(0.02) 
-0.408 
(0.43) 
0.9036 
(0.13) 
-0.333 
(0.22) 
           
n    1,936  1,936  163  1,462 
Wald-statistic    190.97
***  191.43
***  177.67
***  147.81
*** 
Pseudo R
2 (%)    19.50  20.02  35.91  19.32 
Percent Concordant    75.1  75.1  84.0  74.6 
 
The variables used in the regression model are as defined in Appendix 1. In column (3), low Shu‟s score subsample 
consists of firms with auditor change included in the bottom 10 percentile of annual litigation score based on Shu   62 
(2000) among all firms listed in the Compustat. In column (4), low litigious industry subsample consists of firms with 
auditor change operating in a less litigious industry. Litigious industries are industries with SIC codes 2833–2836, 
3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370, following LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008). We run the logistic 
regression clustered by firm (Petersen, 2009). For each variable, we report the regression coefficient, followed by the 
robust Wald statistic in parentheses. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively.   63 
Table 6: Sensitivity Tests 
 
 
Panel A:  Conservatism measured over the three years 
  Litigation test         
  Full sample  Industry-matched Sample  Restatement Test  Fee test  Going-concern opinion test  Resignation test 
CONSV_3YR  -3.110
*** 
(15.77) 
-2.999
*** 
(15.43) 
-0.487
*** 
(12.46) 
-0.257
*** 
(-7.21) 
-1.253
*** 
(8.74) 
-1.457
*** 
(14.23) 
ProbLit 
 
    0.076 
(0.01) 
13.547
*** 
(9.15) 
34.398
** 
(22.88) 
8.609 
(0.70) 
Controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
             
n  14,736  4,846  13,392  15,376  5,228  1,537 
R-square (%)  16.56  19.06  3.80  80.22  29.88  17.75 
This panel reports main regression results with conservatism measured over the three years (CONSV_3YR). We estimate CONSV_3YR by averaging C_Score in KW over the previous 
three years and then forming deciles from 0 to 1.To conserve space, we report the coefficient estimates and significances for the variables of interests only.  
 
 
Panel B: Tests with adjusted conservatism 
  Litigation test         
  Full Sample  Industry-matched Sample  Restatement Test  Fee test  Going-concern opinion test  Resignation test 
ADJ_CONSV  -2.211
*** 
(12.34) 
-1.112
** 
(4.24) 
-0.443
*** 
(6.71) 
-0.093
*** 
(-4.17) 
-0.640
*** 
(7.51) 
-0.739
** 
(4.95) 
ProbLit 
 
    6.697
** 
(4.09) 
12.603
*** 
(8.64) 
31.611
** 
(22.75) 
6.968 
(0.49) 
Controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
             
N  11,717  3,589  11,975  14,180  4,375  1,312 
R-square (%)  16.28  17.48  3.88  80.25  30.09  17.94 
This panel reports main regression results with adjusted conservatism as explained in the Appendix 3. To conserve space, we report the coefficient estimates and significances for the 
variables of interests only.  
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Table 6: Sensitivity Tests (continued) 
 
Panel C: Conservatism measured by non-operating accruals over previous three years (CONSV_NOA_3YR) 
 
  Litigation test         
  Full Sample  Industry-matched Sample  Restatement Test  Fee test  Going-concern opinion test  Resignation test 
CONSV_NOA_3YR  -0.502
*** 
(6.30) 
-1.269
** 
(4.01) 
-0.010
** 
(4.57) 
-0.216
*** 
(-4.13) 
-0.548 
(1.94) 
-0.498
** 
(5.51) 
ProbLit 
 
    0.433
*** 
(7.40) 
19.092
*** 
(13.46) 
27.220
** 
(5.86) 
1..122 
(0.02) 
Controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
             
n  19,887  6,743  19,015  22,478  7,819  2,384 
R-square (%)  14.97  16.79  3.85  76.97  43.14  18.27 
This panel reports results of the litigation test, audit fee test, going-concern opinion test, and resignation test when conservatism is alternatively measured by (-1) times the average of non-
operating accruals over the previous three years (CONSV_NOA_3YR). Based on Givoly and Hayn (2000), non-operating accruals are computed as follows (all items deflated by beginning 
total assets): non-operating accruals = Total accruals (before depreciation) − Operating accruals = [(Net Income + Depreciation) − Cash flow from operations] − (Δ Accounts receivable + 
Δ Inventories + Δ Prepaid expenses − Δ Accounts payable − Δ Taxes payable). To conserve space, we report the coefficient estimates and significances for the variable of interests only.  
 
 
Panel D: Removing book-to-market, firm size and leverage 
  Litigation test         
  Full Sample  Industry-matched Sample  Restatement Test  Fee test  Going-concern opinion test  Resignation test 
CONSV  -3.127
*** 
(24.15) 
-2.841
*** 
(19.40) 
-0.453
*** 
(11.72) 
-0.681
*** 
(-19.84) 
-0.570
** 
(4.79) 
-0.517
* 
(3.34) 
ProbLit 
 
    1.018
** 
(4.20) 
39.181
*** 
(20.14) 
12.147 
(1.19) 
8.007 
(0.77) 
Controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
             
n  17,961  6,171  15,767  18,824  7,049  1,936 
R-square (%)  11.53  11.56  3.72  67.05  29.92  14.74 
This panel reports main regression results after excluding the book-to-market ratio (BM), firm size (Size or Ln_Assets) and leverage (Leverage) from control variables in each model. To 
conserve space, we report the coefficient estimates and significances for the variables of interests only.    65 
Table 6: Sensitivity Tests (continued) 
Panel E: Controlling for endogeneity 
  Litigation test         
  Full Sample  Industry-matched Sample  Restatement Test  Fee test  Going-concern opinion test  Resignation test 
RES 
2.262 
(0.24) 
1.228 
(0.07) 
12.212
*** 
(35.19) 
3.040
*** 
(5.53) 
-3.874 
(0.67) 
0.451 
(0.03) 
Controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
             
n  17,902  6,153  15,680  18,786  5,426  1,822 
R-square (%)  16.41  18.57  4.60  79.07  27.95  19.93 
 
Predict_CONSV 
    -12.815
*** 
(39.54) 
-3.344
*** 
(-6.03) 
   
Controls      YES  YES     
n      15,680  18,786     
R-square (%)      4.52  78.96     
This panel reports the result of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to examine whether the dependent variable in each model is affected by the endogeneity bias. When the endogeneity cannot 
be rejected in the test, we perform a two-stage instrumental variable approach and use the predicted value of conservatism (Predict_CONSV) in the second-stage regression model. To 
conserve space, we report the coefficient estimates and significances for the variables of interests only.  
 
Panel F: Controlling for signed discretionary accruals (Signed_DA) 
  Litigation test   
Restatement Test 
 
Fee test 
 
Going-concern opinion test 
 
Resignation test    Full Sample  Industry-matched Sample 
CONSV  -1.696
*** 
(8.82) 
-2.155
*** 
(10.85) 
-0.845
*** 
(11.09) 
-0.172
*** 
(-6.93) 
-1.513
*** 
(19.82) 
-1.418
*** 
(22.21) 
ProbLit      0.478 
(0.02) 
14.298
*** 
(10.31) 
30.714
*** 
(12.44) 
16.642 
(2.45) 
Signed_DA 
 
0.001 
(0.11) 
0.187
** 
(4.90) 
0.001 
(1.45) 
0.001
** 
(2.43) 
0.002 
(0.28) 
1.222
** 
(5.60) 
Controls      YES  YES  YES  YES 
             
n  17,961  6,171  15,318  18,293  6,918  1,936 
R-square (%)  16.80  18.61  3.87  79.68  33.58  20.83 
This  panel  reports  main  regression  results  when  signed  discretionary  accruals  (Signed_DA)  are  additionally  controlled  for.  Performance-adjusted  signed  discretionary  accruals 
(Signed_DA) is obtained by subtracting from each firm‟s abnormal accrual the median abnormal accrual from the corresponding ROA-industry decile to which the firm belongs. To 
conserve space, we report the coefficient estimates and significances for the variables of interests only.      66 
Table 6: Sensitivity Tests (continued) 
 
Panel G: Controlling for absolute discretionary accruals (Abs_DA) 
  Litigation test 
Full Sample           Industry-matched Sample  Restatement Test  Fee test  Going-concern opinion test 
 
Resignation test 
CONSV  -1.678
*** 
(8.73) 
-2.018
*** 
(9.38) 
-0.845
*** 
(11.09) 
-0.171
*** 
(-6.93) 
-1.520
*** 
(19.89) 
-1.064
*** 
(9.57) 
ProbLit      0.481 
(0.02) 
14.298
*** 
(10.31) 
30.772
*** 
(12.46) 
25.005
** 
(5.24) 
Abs_DA 
 
0.194 
(0.31) 
0.962 
(2.43) 
0.001 
(2.15) 
0.001
*** 
(2.57) 
0.034 
(0.62) 
0.001
** 
(4.42) 
Controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
             
n  17,961  6,171  15,318  18,293  6,918  1,936 
R-square (%)  16.91  18.99  3.87  79.68  33.60  20.02 
This panel reports main regression results when absolute values of discretionary accruals (Abs_DA) are additionally controlled for. Abs_DA is the absolute value of Signed_DA. To 
conserve space, we report the coefficient estimates and significances for the variables of interests only.  
 
 Panel H: Controlling for income-increasing discretionary accruals  
  Litigation test  Restatement Test  Fee test  Going-concern opinion test  Resignation test 
Full Sample          Industry- matched Sample         
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 1  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
CONSV  -2.376
*** 
(15.89) 
-2.344
*** 
(15.18) 
-2.079
*** 
(10.52) 
-1.901
*** 
(8.41) 
-0.813
*** 
(10.55) 
-0.831
*** 
(10.79) 
-0.168
*** 
(-6.89) 
-0.171
*** 
(-6.86) 
-1.486
*** 
(20.25) 
-1.516
*** 
(20.36) 
-1.404
*** 
(21.78) 
-1.402
*** 
(21.76) 
ProbLit  12.049
* 
(2.64) 
12.518
* 
(2.80) 
8.538
* 
(1.30) 
9.720
 
(1.74) 
0.909 
(0.06) 
0.188 
(0.00) 
14.178
*** 
(10.30) 
14.107
*** 
(10.22) 
31.127
*** 
(12.36) 
30.380
*** 
(11.63) 
15.037 
(2.19) 
14.952 
(2.17) 
POS_DA  0.269 
(0.79) 
-0.151 
(0.20) 
0.491
* 
(2.84) 
-0.196 
(0.33) 
0.109 
(1.81) 
0.065 
(0.56) 
0.023
* 
(1.73) 
0.032
** 
(2.38) 
0.049 
(0.15) 
0.045 
(0.12) 
0.189 
(1.09) 
0.191 
(1.11) 
POS_DA* 
Signed_ DA 
  -0.510 
(0.83) 
  -1.172
* 
(2.73) 
  -0.001 
(1.12) 
  -0.001
*** 
(-2.90) 
  -0.001 
(0.87) 
  -0.001
 
(0.42) 
Controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
n  17,961  17,961  6,171  6,171  15,318  15,318  18,293  18,293  6,918  6,918  1,936  1,936 
R-square (%)  17.00  17.13  18.62  19.17  3.90  3.84  79.75  79.70  33.53  33.56  20.54  20.55 
   
This panel reports main regression results after controlling for income-increasing discretionary accruals only for the subsample with positive discretionary accruals.  In model 1, we 
include  POS_DA,  an  indicator  variable  that  equals  one  if  signed  discretionary  accruals  (Signed_DA)  is  positive  and  zero  otherwise.  In  model  2,  we  include  an  interaction  term, 
POS_DA*Signed DA, and POS_DA. Performance-adjusted signed discretionary accruals (Signed_DA) is obtained by subtracting from each firm‟s abnormal accrual the median abnormal 
accrual from the corresponding ROA-industry decile to which the firm belongs. To conserve space, we report the coefficient estimates and significances for the variables of interests only.   67 
Table 6: Sensitivity Tests (continued) 
 
Panel I: Client firms audited by Big 4 or Big 5 auditors only 
 
  Litigation test         
  Full Sample  Industry-matched Sample  Restatement Test  Fee test  Going-concern opinion test  Resignation test 
CONSV  -1.791
*** 
(9.41) 
-2.353
*** 
(10.75) 
-0.961
*** 
(11.77) 
-0.182
*** 
(-6.77) 
-1.501
*** 
(12.76) 
-1.323
*** 
(10.02) 
ProbLit      1.746 
(0.23) 
12.895
*** 
(8.93) 
25.751
*** 
(6.54) 
25.596
** 
(4.78) 
Controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
             
n  15,432  5,343  13,116  15,866  5,329  1,645 
R-square (%)  19.01  19.99  4.17  79.57  35.84  18.18 
This panel reports main regression results when the sample only consists of client firms audited by Big 4 or Big 5 auditors. To conserve space, we report the coefficient estimates and 
significances for the variables of interests only.  
 
Panel J: Controlling for corporate governance 
  Litigation test 
Full Sample           Industry-matched Sample  Restatement test 
 
Fee test  Going-concern opinion test  Resignation test 
CONSV  -1.601
*** 
(6.74) 
-1.780
*** 
(7.76) 
-0.797
*** 
(10.00)
 
-0.157
*** 
(-6.54) 
-1.685
*** 
(22.65) 
-1.238
*** 
(13.46) 
ProbLit 
      1.207
* 
(0.12) 
13.634
*** 
(9.97) 
25.058
*** 
(6.14) 
31.739
*** 
(6.85) 
Gindex 
 
-0.039 
(0.39) 
0.005 
(0.01) 
-0.019 
(0.70) 
0.012
** 
(2.01) 
0.121 
(0.73) 
-0.010 
(0.02) 
Duality 
 
-0.346 
(1.56) 
-0.339 
(1.30) 
0.046 
(0.20) 
0.046
** 
(2.12) 
0.259 
(0.17) 
0.262 
(0.68) 
Executive 
 
1.097 
(1.76) 
0.921 
(1.26) 
0.176 
(0.29) 
-0.165
** 
(-1.93) 
0.144 
(0.00) 
-0.077 
(0.00) 
Meeting 
 
-6.019
* 
(2.83) 
-6.067
* 
(2.72) 
0.697 
(1.18) 
-0.843
*** 
(-4.10) 
-8.178
* 
(3.13) 
-7.826
** 
(4.62) 
 Controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
             
n  17,961  6,171  15,767  18,824  7,049  1,936 
R-square (%)  17.90  20.11  4.02  79.93  37.80  21.86 
This panel reports main regression results when four corporate governance variables in Lara et al. (2009) are additionally controlled for. Gindex is the antitakeover protection index 
constructed by Gompers et al. (2003). Duality is an indicator variable, equals 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. Executive is the proportion of executives on the 
board of directors. Meeting is the annual number of meetings of the board of directors. To conserve space, we report the coefficient estimates and significances for the variables of 
interests only.   68 
Table 7: Tests with Less Litigious Countries 
 
Panel A: Mean values of variables by country for the audit fee test 
 
Country  n  LAUDIT  CONSV  Size  Quick  Loss  ROA  Leverage  Inv_Rec  BM  FOPS  Finance  BigN  Busy 
Germany  41  3.691  0.398  5.176  1.810  0.146  0.057  0.648  0.360  1.069  0.171  0.390  0.634  0.927 
France  288  3.957  0.461  5.237  1.486  0.302  0.024  1.073  0.405  0.624  0.031  0.382  0.438  0.837 
Italy  33  3.434  0.357  5.787  1.177  0.333  -0.014  1.822  0.381  75.765  0.000  0.394  1.000  0.879 
Sweden  970  3.416  0.521  4.555  1.856  0.340  -0.046  0.532  0.340  0.867  0.088  0.430  0.911  0.926 
Total  1,332  3.542  0.500  4.752  1.759  0.326  -0.027  0.685  0.356  2.676  0.076  0.417  0.803  0.905 
 
Panel B: Pearson’s correlations among variables in the audit fee test 
 
 
LAUDIT  CONSV  Size  Quick  Loss  ROA  Leverage  Inv_Rec  BM  FOPS  Finance  BigN  Busy 
LAUDIT  1.00 
                        CONSV  -0.08  1.00 
                      Size  0.81  -0.17  1.00 
                    Quick  -0.31  0.00  -0.15  1.00 
                  Loss  -0.34  0.12  -0.45  0.18  1.00 
                ROA  0.26  -0.12  0.40  -0.07  -0.53  1.00 
              Leverage  0.18  0.02  0.09  -0.16  0.02  0.01  1.00 
            Inv_Rec  0.09  0.02  -0.04  -0.34  -0.13  0.14  0.03  1.00 
          BM  0.10  0.04  -0.03  -0.01  -0.02  0.01  -0.01  0.05  1.00 
        FOPS  0.13  -0.04  0.15  -0.03  -0.12  0.09  -0.04  0.00  -0.01  1.00 
      Finance  0.09  -0.03  0.10  -0.04  0.04  -0.08  0.08  -0.11  -0.02  -0.02  1.00 
    BigN  0.12  0.02  0.14  -0.02  -0.05  -0.02  -0.01  -0.09  0.01  0.09  0.02  1.00 
  Busy  0.06  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.05  -0.06  -0.02  -0.02  0.01  0.05  0.05  0.05  1.00 
 
Panels A and B report the mean values of the variables by country, and the Pearson‟s correlations among variables for the audit fee test. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided 
in Appendix 1.    69 
Table 7: Tests with Less Litigious Countries (continued) 
 
Panel C: OLS Regression of Audit Fee Model 
 
LAUDIT =γ0 + γ1 CONSV + γ2 Size + γ3 Quick + γ4 Loss + γ5 ROA + γ6 Leverage 
+ γ7 Inv_Rec + γ8 BM + γ9 FOPS + γ10 Finance + γ11 BigN + γ12 Busy 
 + Industry & Year Dummies + e 
 
Variable  Predicted 
Sign  (1)  (2) 
CONSV 
-    -0.256
*** 
(-3.61) 
Size 
+  0.639
*** 
(28.18) 
0.616
*** 
(26.20) 
Quick 
-  -0.084
*** 
(-4.19) 
-0.084
*** 
(-4.19) 
Loss 
+  0.149
** 
(2.12) 
0.154
** 
(2.20) 
ROA 
-  -0.438
*** 
(-3.51) 
-0.439
*** 
(-3.54) 
Leverage 
+  1.227
*** 
(4.87) 
1.259
*** 
(4.98) 
Inv_Rec 
+  0.768
*** 
(3.65) 
0.768
*** 
(3.66) 
BM 
-  0.003
*** 
(25.80) 
0.003
*** 
(25.42) 
FOPS 
+  0.085 
(0.81) 
0.075 
(0.72) 
Finance 
+  -0.051 
(-0.96) 
-0.042 
(-0.79) 
BigN 
+  0.065 
(0.75) 
0.069 
(0.79) 
Busy 
+  0.256
** 
(1.94) 
0.243
* 
(1.88) 
Intercept 
 
?  -0.168 
(-0.84) 
0.074 
(0.36) 
Country and Year Dummies 
   
YES 
 
YES 
       
n    1,332  1,332 
Adj. R
2 (%)    75.17  75.33 
 
Panel C reports the results for the audit fee test where dependent variable is the log of audit fees in thousands of US 
dollars  (LAUDIT).  The  OLS  regression  is  clustered  by  firm  (Petersen  2009).  For  each  variable,  we  report  the 
regression coefficient, followed by the robust t-statistic in parentheses. To conserve space, we do not report the 
coefficient estimates for the country and year dummies. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels (two-tailed), respectively.   70 
 
Table 7: Tests with Less Litigious Countries (continued) 
Panel D: Mean values of variables by country for the modified opinion test 
 
Country  n  MOPIN  CONSV  Zscore  Size  Returns  BM  Leverage  LLoss  Investment  CashFlow  Finance  BigN 
Germany  962  0.123  0.520  -3.273  3.607  0.070  1.234  1.511  0.581  0.180  -0.025  0.328  0.349 
France  595  0.282  0.391  -3.317  3.932  0.079  1.350  1.414  0.476  0.158  -0.031  0.429  0.392 
Italy  362  0.337  0.561  -3.066  4.743  4.626  27.318  1.951  0.663  0.113  -0.008  0.420  0.674 
Sweden  449  0.011  0.537  -3.255  5.690  0.366  1.035  0.541  0.688  0.245  -0.153  0.423  0.713 
Total  2,368  0.174  0.580  -3.249  4.257  0.825  5.213  1.370  0.587  0.176  -0.048  0.386  0.478 
 
Panel E: Pearson’s correlations among variables in the modified opinion test 
 
 
MOPIN  CONSV  Zscore  Size  Returns  BM  Leverage  LLoss  Investment  CashFlow  Finance  BigN 
MOPIN  1.00 
                      CONSV  -0.05  1.00 
                    Zscore  0.16  0.08  1.00 
                  Size  -0.14  -0.20  -0.10  1.00 
                Returns  0.07  0.03  -0.02  0.12  1.00 
              BM  0.07  -0.04  0.01  -0.03  -0.01  1.00 
            Leverage  0.13  0.05  0.28  -0.07  0.00  0.00  1.00 
          LLoss  0.06  0.15  0.10  -0.20  -0.01  0.02  0.04  1.00 
        Investment  -0.08  0.06  -0.21  -0.01  0.00  -0.03  -0.16  0.19  1.00 
      CashFlow  0.05  -0.05  -0.17  -0.06  0.01  -0.02  0.08  -0.10  -0.29  1.00 
    Finance  0.00  -0.02  0.12  0.17  0.05  0.03  0.03  -0.07  -0.09  -0.09  1.00 
  BigN  0.17  -0.04  0.08  0.22  0.08  0.05  0.05  0.07  -0.02  -0.02  0.00  1.00 
  
Panels D and E report the mean values of the variables by country, and the correlations among variables for the modified opinion test. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in 
Appendix 1.   71 
Table 7: Tests with Less Litigious Countries (continued) 
 
Panel F: Regression Results for Modified Opinion Model 
 
MOPIN = λ + λ1 CONSV + λ2 ZScore + λ3 Size + λ4 Return + λ5 Leverage + λ6 LLoss  
  + λ7 Investment + λ8 Cashflow + λ9 Future_Finance + λ10 BigN + λ11 BM  
   + Year Dummies + e 
 
Variable  Predicted 
Sign  (1)                                   (2) 
CONSV  - 
  -0.773
*** 
(10.39) 
ZScore  + 
0.262
*** 
(18.57) 
0.271
*** 
(19.34) 
Size  - 
-0.204
*** 
(23.30) 
-0.229
*** 
(26.72) 
Return  - 
0.023
* 
(3.68) 
0.025
** 
(3.92) 
Leverage  + 
0.030
* 
(3.40) 
0.031
* 
(3.39) 
LLoss  + 
-0.084 
(0.41) 
-0.041 
(0.10) 
Investment  - 
-0.711
* 
(3.34) 
-0.649
* 
(2.75) 
Cashflow  - 
0.487 
(2.54) 
0.441 
(2.00) 
Future_Finance  - 
0.136 
(1.12) 
0.139 
(1.17) 
BigN  + 
0.461
*** 
(10.62) 
0.445
*** 
(10.19) 
BM  ? 
0.001
** 
(4.62) 
0.001
** 
(6.05) 
Intercept  ? 
-2.379
*** 
(80.95) 
-1.853
*** 
(32.95) 
Country and Year Dummies  ?  YES  YES 
       
n    2,368  2,368 
Wald-statistic    230.79
***  229.82
*** 
Pseudo R
2 (%)    24.24  25.00 
Percent Concordant    78.0  78.3 
 
Panel F reports the results for the modified opinion test where the dependent variable is 1 if the auditor issued 
modified audit opinion and 0 otherwise (MOPIN). The number of modified opinions included in the analysis equals 
413.  The  logistic  regression  is  clustered  by  firm  (Petersen  2009).  For  each  variable,  we  report  the  regression 
coefficient, followed by the robust Wald statistic in parentheses.  To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient 
estimates for the country and year dummies. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-
tailed), respectively. 
 